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TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE: TAILORING 
CEO COMPENSATION TO INDIVIDUAL 
PERSONALITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
William O. Fisher∗ 
Eight-figure compensation. Cash. Restricted stock. 
Options. Performance shares. And more. Companies shower 
their CEOs with pay in large amounts, delivered in multiple 
ways, and dependent on complex and intricate formulae. It is 
all intended to motivate the top officers to make decisions that 
will best benefit their companies. Common sense tells us that 
the value of a complicated, multifaceted pay package—and 
hence its ability to motivate—will depend on the 
psychological characteristics and financial circumstances of 
the particular executive being paid. Economic theory and 
empirical studies confirm this intuition. Yet, companies 
generally ignore these vital factors. Substantive and 
disclosure law should push them to take these key variables 
into account.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s public companies1 provide prodigious pay 
packages to their chief executive officers (“CEOs”). These 
companies pay in multiple, complicated ways. Not only do 
 
1 A “public company,” for purposes of this Article, is one that has 
registered a security on a national securities exchange (such as the New 
York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq) under section 12(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act or has registered a class of equity securities under section 
12(g) because its assets and shareholder base meet or exceed the section 
12(g) floor. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012). 
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they use salaries, but also cash bonuses and a wide variety of 
equity vehicles—stock options, service-based restricted stock, 
and performance shares. The values of the options, restricted 
stock, and performance shares depend on the market price of 
the company’s stock in the future. The number of 
performance shares and the amounts of cash bonuses depend 
on multiple measures of company performance, weighted and 
bounded in complicated equations. 
All of it is designed to motivate the top officers to make 
decisions that strike the right balance between caution and 
audacity, protection of existing company value and growth, 
and safety and risk. The multiple participants in the pay-
setting process, and the experts they hire, earnestly seek this 
goal. 
But no one focuses on the individual CEO they are trying 
to motivate: companies rarely consider the personality and 
financial condition of the CEO. This defies intuition, human 
experience, decades of economic thought, and volumes of 
studies. As a result, compensation is cumbersome, wasteful, 
and only matches well with the characteristics and 
circumstances of individual CEOs by luck. There must be a 
better way, and law can play a part in moving companies 
toward it. 
This Article collects the theory and empirical evidence 
showing the connection between such individual traits as 
risk aversion and reaction to complex incentive schemes, on 
the one hand, and the value of compensation to different 
individuals, on the other hand. It then shows how the law 
can encourage use of that connection to improve CEO pay. 
Part II describes current top-officer compensation, 
particularly its complexity and the reasons for that 
complexity. Part III shows that companies do not design 
complex pay packages with the personality and financial 
circumstances of the CEO in mind, even though the 
individual personality and finances of a CEO are key factors 
affecting motivation. Part III then demonstrates that failure 
to individually tailor compensation fails to maximize 
incentive effects. Part IV proposes state and federal law 
reforms to push companies toward bringing the pay systems 
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and the individual characteristics together. The reforms 
permit experimentation, avoid regimentation, recognize that 
constructive change will take time, and, although giving all 
public companies a push, allow each to make substantive 
adjustments at its own pace. 
II. CEO PAY TODAY 
This Part begins by demonstrating that CEO 
compensation is complex and public companies consider it 
important. This Part next sets out the principal components 
of CEO pay packages, using CEO pay at a railroad, Norfolk 
Southern Corp. (“NSC”),2 as a case study. To show that 
NSC’s pay scheme is not an aberration, this Part describes 
the CEO pay packages at four very different companies: 
computer chip manufacturer Intel;3 integrated oil and gas 
company Chevron;4 healthcare product and pharmaceutical 
manufacturer Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”);5 and financial 
industry giant JPMorgan Chase (“JPM”) (collectively with 
NSC the “Exemplar Companies”).6 By a summary of studies, 
this Part then documents that the complicated pay practices 
of these Exemplar Companies represent the norm. This Part 
concludes by arguing that these elaborate pay schemes, 
considered in the abstract, are rational in the sense that they 
are designed to motivate CEOs to pursue multiple objectives, 
to promote both short-term and long-term economic success, 
and to balance risk and caution in order to increase, rather 
than erode, company value. 
 
2 NSC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter NSC 
2015 10-K]. 
3 Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter 
Intel 2015 10-K]. 
4 Chevron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2015) 
[hereinafter Chevron 2015 10-K]. 
5 J&J, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2015) [hereinafter J&J 
2015 10-K]. 
6 JPM, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2015) [hereinafter JPM 
2015 10-K]. 
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A. The Intricacy and Importance of CEO Pay 
Companies describe their executive pay in proxy 
statements per federal regulations.7 These regulations 
require a company to disclose compensation to the principal 
executive officer (usually the CEO), the principal financial 
officer, and the three other most highly compensated 
executive officers (collectively the “named executive officers” 
or “NEOs”).8 Companies pay particular attention to 
explaining the compensation paid to the CEO. An 
examination of the length of these disclosures, and a 
comparison of that length to the length of disclosures 
describing company financial performance, proves revealing. 
Table 1 shows the number of pages that each of the 
Exemplar Companies devoted in its 2015 proxy statement to 
2014 compensation for its NEOs. Table 1 also compares the 
length of that disclosure with the aggregate number of pages 
that each company allocated—in its Form 10-K annual 
report for the 2014 year—to Risk Factors,9 Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results 
of Operations,10 and Financial Statements and 
Supplementary Data.11 
 
7 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(2) & (3) (2017). 
8 Id. 
9 Form 10-K, Item 1A requires companies to discuss Risk Factors, 
defined as “the most significant factors that make [investment in the 
company] speculative or risky.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2017); see SEC, 
FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 8 (2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB5M-YKXT] 
[hereinafter 10-K GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS]. 
10 Form 10-K, Item 7 requires companies to provide Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 
with 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 setting out the details of the disclosure. See 17 
C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017); 10-K, supra note 9, at 9. The Commission has said 
that Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) “is intended to give 
the investor an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of 
management by providing both a short and long-term analysis of the 
business of the company.” Concept Release on Management’s Discussion 
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Pages as % of 
Pages Describing 
Key Business Risks 
& Results 
NSC 3812 6113 62% 
Intel 2814 9315 30% 
J&J 4316 6717 64% 
Chevron 3018 7419 41% 
JPM 3420 25421 13% 
 
Table 1 shows that each Exemplar Company used more 
than two dozen pages to explain its compensation program 
 
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 
13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987). 
11 Form 10-K, Item 8 requires companies to include financial 
statements and other financial schedules as set out in Regulation S-X, 
which in turn requires (among other things) that companies include in 
their 10-Ks audited balance sheets for the year just ended and the year 
before, as well as audited income statements and cash flow statements for 
the year just ended and the preceding two years. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-01(a), 
-02(a) (2017). 
12 NSC, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 45–82 (Mar. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter NSC 2015 Proxy Statement]. 
13 NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K13–K16, K21–K35, K36–K77. 
14 Intel, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 37–64 (Apr. 2, 2015) 
[hereinafter Intel 2015 Proxy Statement]. 
15 Intel 2015 10-K, supra note 3, at 18–25, 31–50, 52–116. 
16 J&J, Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement (Form DEF 
14A) 29–71 (Mar. 11, 2015) [hereinafter J&J 2015 Proxy Statement]. 
17 J&J 2015 10-K, supra note 5, Ex. 13 at 1–67. 
18 Chevron, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 28–57 (Apr. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement]. 
19 Chevron 2015 10-K, supra note 4, at 22–24, FS1–FS71. 
20 JPM, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 32–65 (Apr. 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter JPM 2015 Proxy Statement]. 
21 JPM 2015 10-K, supra note 6 at 8–17, 64–169, 171–308. 
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for top officers. These absolute numbers reflect the extreme 
complexity of executive pay. As a benchmark, investors 
believe that a complete proxy statement—addressing not only 
executive pay but also all other matters that come before the 
shareholders at annual meetings22—should ideally run to 
only about twenty-five pages.23 Thus, the pay structures for 
each of the five companies were so complicated that their 
explication required more pages than investors thought 
should be devoted to the entire document. 
Table 1 also shows that four of the five Exemplar 
Companies devoted to the description of top officer pay 29% 
or more of the number of pages that they devoted to the key 
information on their entire operations. Two of the companies 
devoted more than 60% of the space they allotted to the most 
 
22 For example, listing standards require that shareholders vote on 
equity compensation plans. NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 
§ 303A.08 (2017); NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5635(c) 
(2017). The Internal Revenue Code also requires that shareholders 
approve incentive plans so that the compensation to an executive under 
those plans not count toward the $1 million limit on a company’s 
deduction of the compensation for any given executive. 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 162(m)(1), (m)(4)(C)(ii) (2012). Shareholders have the right not only to 
propose resolutions at shareholder meetings, but—subject to certain 
important limitations—the right to require that a shareholder-proposed 
resolution appear on the proxy card that the company distributes to 
shareholders and to require that the company’s proxy statement include 
the shareholders’ brief statement supporting the resolutions. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8 (2017). One count through June 30, 2015 tallied 536 
shareholder proposals voted on at the 2015 annual meetings of U.S. 
companies in the Russell 3000 index. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2015 
PROXY SEASON REVIEW 1 (July 20, 2015). 
23 See STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., RR DONNELLY, EQUILAR & 
ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY: 
DECONSTRUCTING PROXY STATEMENTS—WHAT MATTERS TO INVESTORS 
[hereinafter 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY]. The researchers surveyed “64 asset 
managers and owners with a combined $17 trillion in assets” in the fall of 
2014. Id. at 1. Respondents “report[ed] that the ideal length of a proxy is 
25 pages, compared to the actual average of 80 pages among companies in 
the Russell 3000.” Id. Funds with more than $100 billion under 
management said that the ideal length was thirty-three pages, and funds 
managing smaller portfolios identified twenty-one pages as best. Id. at 13. 
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important data on business operations. This relative 
comparison demonstrates the extreme importance that the 
companies—and the SEC, which issued the regulations 
prompting this torrent of words—attribute to executive 
compensation as a driver of firm success. 
B. The Many Parts of a CEO Pay Package 
CEOs may receive several different types of 
compensation. Although not all companies pay their CEOs in 
all of these ways and each element of compensation varies 
from company to company, here are typical components: 
1. A fixed annual salary; 
2. An annual incentive payment, usually in cash, with 
the amount of the payment dependent on the extent 
to which the company and/or the individual 
achieves specified objectives; 
3. Equity,24 including one or more of: 
a. a stock option grant, which—after the CEO 
works through a vesting period—permits the 
CEO to buy stock during a set number of years 
at a fixed price; 
b. a service-based restricted stock grant or 
restricted stock units grant, which—after the 
CEO continues to work at the company through 
a vesting period during which he or she cannot 
sell the shares—provides the CEO with fully 
tradable stock; and 
c. a performance-share grant or performance-
share-units grant, which provides the CEO with 
fully tradable shares of stock at the conclusion of 
a performance period, with the number of shares 
 
24 Equity includes all payment vehicles that ultimately provide the 
executive with shares of his or her company’s common stock or some 
amount of money that is expressly equal to the market value of some 
number of shares of that stock at a designated time. 
FISHER –FINAL  
No. 2:599] TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE 607 
dependent on company financial results during 
that time; 
4. Credits toward pension payments or other 
actuarially defined retirement benefits; 
5. Perquisites ranging from use of a corporate airplane 
to financial planning; and 
6. Plans or agreements that provide economic benefit 
to the CEO if he or she retires, is terminated, or the 
control of the company changes.25 
This Article concentrates on the second and third 
components, as companies tend to characterize these as 
“incentive compensation”—that is, compensation designed to 
affect the decisions that the CEO makes as he or she runs 
the company.26 
C. How Companies Combine the Components 
This subpart demonstrates the current complexity of 
executive compensation schemes. First, it describes the 
compensation for the Article’s Exemplar Companies, 
especially NSC. The subpart then demonstrates that CEO 
pay packages at other public companies generally display 
similar intricacies. 
 
25 For useful lists and summaries of the different forms of 
compensation, see the SEC disclosure rule at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017). 
See also DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES 214–15 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter LARCKER & TAYAN, 
GOVERNANCE MATTERS]; ROBERT W. KOLB, TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH: 
INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 11–23 (2012) [hereinafter KOLB, 
NOT ENOUGH]. 
26 LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 229 
(“Short-term incentives offer an annual payment (usually cash) for 
achieving predetermined performance objectives.”); id. at 232 (“Long-term 
incentives are added to the compensation mix to encourage executives to 
select long-term investments that increase shareholder value.”); id. at 
232–34 (characterizing stock options and other equity as long-term 
incentive vehicles). 
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NSC—a mundane freight railroad—compensated its top 
executive, Charles Moorman, for the year 2014 in multiple 
and complex ways.27 NSC paid him cash through an annual 
salary and an annual cash incentive payment.28 NSC also 
paid him equity through three different vehicles: 
performance share units (“PSUs”), stock options, and service-
based restricted stock units (“RSUs”).29 
Mr. Moorman’s incentive compensation depended on two 
different sets of performance measures, also termed metrics. 
Three metrics determined his annual cash incentive 
payment, but one of those was subdivided into three 
components.30 Consequently, five different measures affected 
his annual cash bonus, and each of the five carried a 
different weight. Two other metrics determined the number 
of shares that he ultimately received from his PSUs—with 
one of those measures depending not just on the performance 
of his own company, but also the performance of other 
railroads or alternatively, if NSC performed poorly by this 
comparison, based on NSC’s performance versus S&P 500 
companies overall.31 
The PSUs and the other two equity vehicles imposed 
intertemporal complexity as well. Each PSU award settled 
three years after grant and depended on performance over 
those three years.32 Each stock-option award that Mr. 
Moorman received provided an option that vested after four 
years, with a different exercise price for the options granted 
in each year because the exercise price for each year’s grant 
equaled the price of NSC stock on the date that NSC granted 
 
27 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 45–82. Appendix A 
sets out CEO Charles Moorman’s 2014 pay package in tabular form. 
28 Id. at 54, 62. 
29 Id. at 56–59, 62. 
30 Id. at 54–56, 62. 
31 Id. at 57–59. The S&P 500 “includes 500 leading companies and 
captures approximately 80% coverage of available market capitalization.” 
S&P DOW JONES INDICES, https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500 
[https:// perma.cc/T7H9-YGKC] (last visited May 22, 2017). 
32 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 57. 
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the option award.33 Each award of service-based restricted 
stock vested after five years.34 Thus, Mr. Moorman was 
always in three different performance cycles for his PSUs, 
four different vesting cycles (with different exercise prices for 
each) for his options, and five different vesting cycles for the 
restricted shares. In addition, since he could exercise his 
options at any time during a multi-year period after vesting, 
he could have at any time vested options that he could 
exercise immediately at as many as seven different prices, 
with the options terminating on as many as seven different 
dates.35 
CEO compensation at the other Exemplar Companies 
confirms that NSC’s compensation scheme for Mr. Moorman 
was not uniquely complex. Appendix B provides the detail, 
and a summary follows. 
Like NSC, Intel paid its CEO an annual cash incentive 
amount and made equity grants to him each year.36 Intel 
used three metrics to determine the annual cash incentive 
award, with one relating to the goals at ten different 
corporate groups (each one of which had, in turn, three to 
four internal goals), for a total of thirty-four variables 
affecting the cash bonus. Intel made annual equity awards 
through two vehicles: PSUs and RSUs.37 The PSUs converted 
to a number of common stock shares based on performance 
over a three-year period, as determined by a different metric 
than those used for the annual cash award—a complicated 
formula relating Intel’s total shareholder return (“TSR”) 
(dividends plus stock price appreciation) to those of peer 
companies.38 Yearly service-based restricted stock grants 
vest quarterly over three years.39 The Intel CEO was 
 
33 Id. at 56. 
34 Id. at 59. 
35 Id. at 68. 
36 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 42–46, 53. 
37 Id. at 42–44, 57–59.  
38 Id. at 46, 56. 
39 Id. at 46. 
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therefore always in three performance cycles and twelve 
RSU vesting cycles. 
The Chevron CEO’s cash bonus depended on four 
different metrics, each assigned a different weight and each 
broken down into subparts, with the aggregate subparts 
totaling thirteen.40 Chevron made equity-style awards 
through two vehicles: performance shares and stock 
options.41 Performance shares depended on the company’s 
TSR rank among other large oil companies, with 
performance measured over three-year cycles.42 But at the 
end of the three years, the CEO received cash equal to the 
then-current market value of the number of performance 
shares earned, instead of the Chevron common stock itself.43 
An option award in each year carried an exercise price equal 
to the stock price at the time of grant, so that the exercise 
price differed from one year’s option award to another year’s 
option award.44 The options in any given award vested over 
three years—one-third in each year.45 The CEO was always 
therefore in three performance-share cycles and three option-
vesting cycles. 
J&J used three different metrics to determine the annual 
cash incentive award, but the 2015 proxy suggested that still 
other factors could play a role. The 2015 proxy provided no 
insight into how the company weighted the different 
variables.46 J&J made annual equity awards through three 
vehicles: PSUs, stock options, and RSUs.47 Five measures 
determined the number of common shares into which a PSU 
award converted at the end of each three-year performance 
cycle. An option award each year vested after three years, 
with the exercise price for any given award set at the price of 
 
40 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 35. 
41 Id. at 38–40. 
42 Id. at 38–40. 
43 Id. at 38, 47 tbl. n.4. 
44 Id. at 38, 47.  
45 Id. at 38. 
46 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 32–33, 36, 39.  
47 Id. at 42–43. 
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J&J stock at the time of the grant.48 The annual RSU award 
vested and converted into J&J common stock at the end of 
three years.49 Thus, the CEO was always in three PSU 
performance cycles, and three cycles for vesting options and 
RSUs. 
JPM’s scheme is difficult to parse because its proxy 
statement is so vague. But the cash bonus and the number of 
RSUs awarded in any given year depended on five factors, 
one of which was “performance,” which in turn divided into 
four factors, each of which, judging by the examples given, 
could be further subdivided.50 In exercising its discretion 
within this construct, the compensation committee 
considered some unspecified multiyear period.51 An RSU 
award—made yearly under this system—vested over three 
years, with half of the award vesting after the second year 
and half after the third.52 
Market-wide surveys show that the great majority of 
public companies pay in similarly complicated ways. For 
example, one study of 100 large publicly traded U.S. 
companies found that in 2014, 67% used three or more 
metrics to determine annual bonus payments.53 The same 
 
48 Id. at 42. 
49 Id. at 43. 
50 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 38–39, 42. 
51 Id. at 38–39, 50. 
52 Id. at 50. 
53 CLEARBRIDGE COMP. GRP., THE CLEARBRIDGE 100 REPORT: ANNUAL 
AND LONG-TERM INCENTIVE DESIGN PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES 5 (2015) 
[hereinafter CLEARBRIDGE 100 REPORT]. This count may actually 
understate the number of metrics, particularly those determining the 
annual cash incentive awards, because surveys typically count separately 
only the financial metrics that companies employ. When non-financial 
measures are included (such as the three incorporated into the composite 
service measure that counted towards Mr. Moorman’s annual cash award), 
the count can be higher. One survey of 200 large U.S. companies found 
that, when non-financial measures were included with financial measures, 
52% of the companies used four or more measures to determine short-term 
incentive payments and 30% used six or more. JAMES F. REDA ET AL., 
STUDY OF 2013 SHORT- AND LONG-TERM INCENTIVE DESIGN CRITERION 
AMONG TOP 200 S&P 500 COMPANIES 16 (2014) [hereinafter REDA, 
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study found that 43% used two long-term incentive vehicles, 
and that 33% used three vehicles.54 Forty percent of those 
making long-term incentive grants used two metrics to 
determine the amount ultimately provided to the top officer, 
and another 24% used three or more.55 The study also found 
that 85% awarded performance shares or PSUs, with 92% of 
those using a three-year performance cycle.56 The majority of 
companies vested both stock options and service-based 
restricted stock (or RSUs) over three years.57 Of those 
companies surveyed, 30% used only a relative measure to 
determine long-term incentive awards, while 23% combined 
both a relative metric and an absolute measure—that is, one 
dependent solely on the performance of the company at 
which the executive worked.58 
In sum, companies employ multiple metrics to determine 
annual and long-term incentives, multiple equity vehicles for 
long-term rewards, multiyear cycles for long-term 
performance measurement,59 multiyear vesting for options, 
 
INCENTIVE DESIGN]; id. at 4 (study based on “the 2014 annual proxy 
statement disclosures for 200 of the top U.S. companies (based on revenue 
and market capitalization)”). 
54 CLEARBRIDGE 100 REPORT, supra note 53, at 8. 
55 Id. at 11. 
56 Id. at 10. 
57 Id. at 9. 
58 Id. at 12 (“Among awards that include a non-stock-based measure 
(i.e., a financial/strategic/operating performance measure), the majority 
(83%) are measured on an absolute basis only. However, among awards 
that use a stock-based measure (e.g., stock price, TSR), performance is 
overwhelmingly measured on a relative basis only (88%).”) (emphasis 
added). 
59 See Ryan Colucci et al., Changing Practices in Executive 
Compensation: Annual Incentive Plan Design, CAP FLASH, Jan. 15, 2015, 
at 1 (reporting results from a review of proxy statements from 100 
companies in the Fortune 500); id. at 3 (“25% of companies disclose using 
two (2) metrics in their annual incentive programs, 25% use three (3) 
metrics, and 21% of companies use four (4) or more metrics.”); Michael 
Biagi et al., Changing Practices in Executive Compensation: Long-Term 
Incentive Plan Design, CAP FLASH, Feb. 12, 2015, at 1 [hereinafter CAP 
Flash, Long-Term Incentive Design] (reporting results from a review of 
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and multiyear vesting for service-based restricted stock.60 
Half or more use a relative measure to determine, in whole 
or in part, the amount of long-term incentive compensation, 
 
proxy statements from 100 companies in the Fortune 500); id. at 2 
(“Companies continue to use multiple vehicles to deliver LTI to executives. 
51% of companies in our study deliver LTI in the form of two vehicles, 29% 
use three vehicles and 20% use only one vehicle. . . . In our study, most 
companies with performance-based LTI plans use two metrics.”); EQUILAR, 
INC., PERFORMANCE METRICS IN ANNUAL INCENTIVE PLANS 1, 3 (2014) 
(analyzing random sample of 50 companies from the S&P 500 filing proxy 
statements between January 1 and April 20, 2013 and finding 31 
companies using two or more financial or market-based metrics, with 27 
using two or three); EQUILAR, INC., MEASURING LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF S&P 500 EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN METRICS 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter EQUILAR, MEASURING LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE] 
(“[E]xamin[ing] the long-term (performance period greater than one year) 
performance-based equity granted to CEOs in the S&P 500 over the past 
three years . . . ” and providing graph showing that a bit over 60% of the 
companies used two or more metrics for long-term incentive 
compensation); MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS, LLC, 2013 TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4 (2013) [hereinafter 
MERIDIAN, 2013 TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION] (reporting survey 
responses from 136 companies); id. at 13 (stating that a “strong majority of 
responding companies (76%) continue to utilize two or more performance 
metrics,” with graph showing 29% using three metrics and 4% using four 
or more); id. at 20 (stating that “[e]ighty-five percent (85%) of respondents 
are actively using 2 or 3 LTI vehicles in 2013 for senior executives” and 
providing a table showing that the most popular vehicles are stock options 
or stock appreciation rights, performance shares or PSUs, and time-
vesting restricted stock or RSUs); id. at 22 (“The great majority of long-
term performance plans use a 3-year performance period (87%). . . .”). 
60 REDA, INCENTIVE DESIGN, supra note 53, at 23. Stock options vested 
“[t]ypically over three years (56%) or four years (34%) with a ten-year term 
(86%) or seven-year term (11%),” with restricted stock or RSUs vesting 
“[t]ypically over the three years (67%) or four years (23%),” and 71% of 
performance-based awards vesting at the end of a three-year performance 
period. Id. The study also reported that 72% of the companies used two or 
more measures for long-term incentive compensation, with 32% using 
three or more. Id. at 16. As to the set of vehicles used as long-term 
incentives, “[t]he most common combinations are a mix of stock options 
and performance-based awards (34%) followed by a blend of stock options, 
time-vested stock, and performance-based awards (29%).” Id. at 21, 22. 
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with a TSR comparison of the executive’s company to that of 
other companies most popular.61 
D. What Companies Are Trying to Do 
Companies design these elaborate compensation schemes 
to motivate their top officers to make decisions that will 
benefit the companies. Each company wants to focus its 
executives on those aspects of the firm’s business, and its 
financial results, central to short-term success. Nonetheless, 
companies also want their CEO to focus on long-term 
financial performance and to align their CEO’s interests with 
those of the company’s shareholders. 
Thus, Mr. Moorman’s annual cash incentive payment for 
2014 depended on (i) NSC’s operating income for the year 
(railway operating revenues minus railway operating 
expenses (e.g., compensation, fuel, and depreciation)); (ii) 
NSC’s operating ratio for the year (essentially the cost, in 
operating expenses, to generate a dollar in operating 
revenue); and (iii) a composite service measure (broken down 
into (a) adherence to operating plan, (b) connection 
 
61 EQUILAR, MEASURING LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE, supra note 59, at 2 
(“Relative TSR continues to be the most popular long-term performance 
metric, appearing in 57.7% of 2013 plans . . . .”); CAP Flash, Long-Term 
Incentive Design, supra note 59, at 3 (“Overall, 49% of companies in our 
study measure performance relative to the external market (typically 
using TSR) . . . . Approximately 92% of companies that use TSR, measure 
performance relative to a defined comparator group (54% use a defined 
peer group, 40% use a broader industry index and 6% use both) . . . .”); 
MERIDIAN, 2013 TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 59, at 23 
(“Sixty-four percent (64%) of performance plans use a relative performance 
metric in 2013, up from 49% in 2012. For those companies, relative 
performance metrics are weighted 79% on average for the performance 
plan. Also, of such plans, approximately 82% use TSR performance 
relative to a peer group or index.”); REDA, INCENTIVE DESIGN, supra note 
53, at 17 (“Of the 185 companies with LTIPs, 61% used at least one 
relative measure in their 2013 LTIP design, slightly higher than last 
year’s 59%. . . . Eighty-one percent (81%) of these companies used TSR as 
the relative measure in 2013 . . . .”). 
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performance, and (c) train performance).62 Roughly, the 
company provided a cash incentive for making a profit, 
getting the most out of each dollar spent in making that 
profit, and running the trains well. 
To stretch his horizon out beyond one year, NSC awarded 
Mr. Moorman PSUs with a three-year performance cycle and 
the number of shares he would ultimately receive at the end 
of the cycle depending on (i) the three-year average of after-
tax return on average invested capital and (ii) NSC’s TSR 
versus the TSR of comparable railroads, or alternatively, if 
NSC fared poorly against the other railroads, the TSR for the 
S&P 500 companies.63 Roughly, the PSU grants provided an 
equity incentive for getting the most profit out of the money 
put into the company and providing a return to shareholders 
better than the return they could earn by investing their 
money in other railroads; or if not, at least a greater return 
than if they invested in a diversified portfolio of other large 
American businesses. 
Thus, the logic of the several incentives was internally 
consistent. And the multiple metrics determining Mr. 
Moorman’s rewards arguably reflected several different ways 
of thinking about NSC’s success. Moreover, the many metrics 
might have prevented him from fixating on one alone, to the 
detriment of others that were also important.64 
 
62 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 54–56. 
63 Id. at 57–59. 
64 See CAROL BOWIE ET AL., ISS, EVALUATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
ALIGNMENT 15 (2014) [hereinafter ISS PAY/PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT] 
(“Use of a single metric, or very similar metrics, in either or both of the 
short- and long-term incentive programs may suggest inappropriate focus 
on one aspect of business results at the expense of others.”); GLASS LEWIS 
& CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY SEASON, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE UNITED STATES 28 (2015) 
[hereinafter GLASS LEWIS 2015 GUIDELINES] (stating that Glass Lewis uses 
“five performance metrics” in its own computations to determine the 
alignment of executive pay with company performance); id. at 29 
(reporting Glass Lewis’s belief that a “well-structured” long-term incentive 
plan should have “[t]wo or more performance metrics” and adding: “While 
cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass 
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Using a mix of both service-based restricted stock and 
stock options made sense too. Theoreticians suggest that 
such a mix can subtly adjust the differing incentives that 
each vehicle provides in order to strike an optimum balance. 
Thus, stock options reward executives for taking risks to 
increase stock price.65 Service-based restricted stock 
encourages more cautious decisions that preserve a stock’s 
existing value.66 The proper mix of options and restricted 
stock might, in theory, lead the top executive to make 
decisions that are usefully aggressive but still appropriately 
cautious.67 Companies seem to attempt this balance.68 
 
Lewis generally believes that measuring a company’s performance with 
multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the 
company’s performance than a single metric; further, reliance on just one 
metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is 
therefore more susceptible to manipulation”). 
65 A stock option is the right, but not the obligation, to purchase stock 
at the exercise price after the option vests but before it expires. The 
exercise price is almost always the price of the stock on the date of the 
option grant. Thus, the executive granted an option at the time that his or 
her company’s stock price is $X/share has an incentive to take on risk in 
order to increase the price of the company’s stock above $X/share after the 
option vests but before the option expires. If the risk produces that result, 
the executive makes money by exercising the option for $X and selling the 
stock into the market for its price above $X. On the other hand, if the risk 
reduces the price of the stock below $X, the executive has not lost any 
money because he or she simply does not exercise the option at all. 
66 Restricted stock converts to common stock after vesting—
regardless of the price of the common stock at that time and without the 
executive paying the company for the removal of the restrictions. Thus, if 
the price of the stock is $X at the time of grant and the executive causes 
the company to take on risk that lowers the price, the executive suffers a 
real loss in the value of the restricted stock. 
67 See KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 87 (“[E]conomic theory 
finds . . . that holdings of [stock options] generally increase the CEO’s 
willingness to take risk, and that very large holdings of restricted stock 
can lead executives to be unwilling to take risks.”); id. at 105 (“The firm 
needs to set an executive pay package that incentivizes risk-taking in the 
right amount and in the right way. . . . Ideally, the right mix of [stock 
options] and restricted stock in a pay package can provide the right 
incentives . . . .”). 
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Finally, all of the equity components of his 
compensation—the stock options, the service-based 
restricted stock, and the performance shares—aligned Mr. 
Moorman’s interests with those of the other NSC 
shareholders. That is, since the ultimate value of each of 
these vehicles depended on the price of NSC’s stock, each one 
motivated him to take actions that would increase the price 
of that stock.69 Such a stock price increase would not only 
benefit Mr. Moorman, but all other NSC shareholders as 
well. Research supports the notion that such an alignment 
works. Studies find a positive association between significant 
top executive ownership of company stock and company 
financial performance.70 
The seeming rationality of the current system rests, 
however, on abstract design. Nothing in the description just 
 
68 Id. at 106 (“These reflections on the incentive effects of stock 
holdings and [stock options] are broadly consistent with the executive pay 
packages observed across the corporate landscape. They almost all utilize 
a mix of both restricted stock and [stock options] as incentivizing and 
restraining elements in the CEO’s pay package.”). 
69 LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 247 
(“In theory, executives who hold equity in the companies they manage—
either directly in the form of stock ownership or indirectly through options, 
restricted stock, or performance shares—have greater incentive to improve 
the economic value of the firm.”). 
70 For example, two researchers studied the effect of CEO stock 
ownership on abnormal stock returns, using data on publicly traded 
companies covering the period January 1988 to June 2010. Ulf Von 
Lilienfeld-Toal & Stefan Ruenzi, CEO Ownership, Stock Market 
Performance, and Managerial Discretion, 69 J. FIN. 1013, 1022 (2014). The 
researchers defined CEO ownership in two different ways, in one of which 
they computed the percentage of total outstanding common stock held by 
the CEO, then ranked firms, top to bottom, by that percentage. Id. at 
1021. After controlling for other factors, they found that even firms in the 
mid-60s percentiles of that ranking outperformed firms with low CEO 
ownership to an economically significant extent and by results that were 
statistically significant. Id. at 1026–28 & tbl.III. See also LARCKER & 
TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 249 (summarizing other 
studies and concluding that “[r]esearch generally supports the notion that 
equity ownership [by executives] is positively associated with firm 
performance”). 
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given says anything about the individual to be motivated—
Mr. Moorman’s personal risk tolerance, his current financial 
condition, or the extent to which his wealth was already 
concentrated in NSC stock. Instead, the description suggests 
that the pay package at NSC was designed to motivate 
whoever occupied the CEO post to make the same decisions 
that would bring short- and long-term prosperity to the 
railroad and its owners. This over-concentration on design 
and under-concentration on the individual is a central error, 
as the next Part shows. 
III. WHY CURRENT CEO PAY IS FUNDAMENTALLY 
IRRATIONAL 
This Part demonstrates that current elaborate pay 
schemes do not take account of the characteristics and 
financial circumstances of individual CEOs. The Part then 
shows that those characteristics and circumstances are 
vitally important to determining whether a company’s 
compensation arrangements in fact motivate a particular 
CEO or not. 
A. Failure to Take Account of Individual CEO 
Personalities and Circumstances 
Federal regulations require that each company include in 
its Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (“CD&A”) “[w]hy 
[it] chooses to pay each [type of compensation],” “[h]ow [the 
company] determines the amount” of each type of 
compensation, “the basis for allocating [long-term] 
compensation to each different type of award,” and “[t]he 
factors considered in decisions to increase or decrease 
compensation materially.”71 Accordingly, if a company is 
selecting a type of compensation or determining the amount 
of compensation on the basis of a CEO’s individual 
characteristics or circumstances, the law requires that the 
 
71 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1)(iv), (v) (2017); id. §229.402(b)(2)(iii), (ix) 
(2017). 
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company disclose that fact. No CD&A of any Exemplar 
Company stated that the firm considered, when designing or 
setting its CEO compensation, any aspect of its top 
executive’s personality or any aspect of his or her current 
financial condition.72 It is therefore fair to conclude that none 
of them did. 
Two sets of experts typically affect top officer pay. The 
companies hire one set, called compensation consultants. 
The shareholders hire another, called proxy advisers. 
The board of directors, with the compensation committee 
of the board playing a key role in the process, set the CEO 
pay at each of the Exemplar Companies.73 Stock exchange 
listing standards require that boards and their compensation 
 
72 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 45–61; Intel 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 37–51; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, 
supra note 16, at 30–53; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 
24–43; JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 32–57. There are 
some exceptions outside the exemplars. Netflix effectively lets executives 
express their individual natures by permitting each one of them, 
individually, to allocate his or her total compensation figure between cash, 
stock options, and performance-based bonuses. Netflix, Inc., Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 29 (Apr. 27, 2016); see also DAVID LARCKER & 
BRIAN TAYAN, A REAL LOOK AT REAL WORLD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 141–
43 (2013) (“The Netflix approach to compensation is highly unique and 
intended to solve traditional problems relating to the economic efficiency 
and incentive value of compensation.”). 
73 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 41 (duties of the 
Compensation Committee include “considering and recommending to the 
independent members of the Board the compensation of the chief executive 
officer”); Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22 (“The 
Compensation Committee is responsible for determining compensation for 
Intel executives (including our CEO and our Chairman) . . . .”); J&J 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 12 (“The Compensation & Benefits 
Committee is responsible for . . . reviewing and recommending for approval 
by the independent Directors of the Board, the compensation for our Chief 
Executive Officer . . . .”); Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 
17 (the Management Compensation Committee “[r]eviews and 
recommends to the independent Directors the salary and other 
compensation for the CEO”); JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 
44 (“Based on [CEO] Dimon’s 2014 performance, the [Compensation & 
Management Development Committee] awarded Mr. Dimon total annual 
compensation of $20 million . . . .”). 
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committees play this key role.74 But the compensation 
committees at four of the five Exemplar Companies hired an 
outside compensation consultant to help the board set the 
pay,75 as both federal law and stock exchange listing 
standards anticipate but do not demand.76 The 80% of 
 
74 E.g., NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(b)(i)(A) 
(2017) (requiring that the compensation committee have a written charter 
that sets out its responsibilities, one of which is to: “[R]eview and approve 
corporate goals and objectives relevant to CEO compensation, evaluate the 
CEO’s performance in light of those goals and objectives, and, either as a 
committee or together with the other independent directors (as directed by 
the board), determine and approve the CEO’s compensation level based on 
this evaluation”); NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5605 (d)(2) 
(2017) (requiring each listed company to have a compensation committee); 
id. at (d)(1) (requiring that the committee have a written charter and that 
the charter state “the compensation committee’s responsibility for 
determining, or recommending to the board for determination, the 
compensation of the chief executive officer”). 
75 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 16 (reporting that 
the company “designed our executive compensation program with advice 
from its compensation consultant”); id. at 42 (“In setting such 
compensation for the directors and the chief executive officer, the 
Compensation Committee considers the recommendations of the 
compensation consultant.”); Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 
22 (reporting that the “Compensation Committee retains an independent 
executive compensation consultant, Farient Advisors LLC, to provide 
input, analysis, and advice about Intel’s executive compensation 
philosophy, peer groups, pay positioning (by pay component and in total), 
compensation design, equity usage and allocation, and risk assessment 
under Intel’s compensation programs”); Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, 
supra note 18, at 42 (reporting that its “[Management Compensation 
Committee] retains an independent compensation consultant—Meridian 
Compensation Partners LLC—to assist it with its duties”); J&J 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 12 (“The Compensation & Benefits 
Committee has retained Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. (FWC) as its 
independent compensation consultant for matters related to executive 
officer and Non-Employee Director compensation.”). 
76 Recognizing the widespread use of compensation consultants, law, 
regulation, and listing standards provide that compensation committees 
must have authority to hire them, and if a consultant is hired, that 
committee must control the selection and evaluation of the consultant and 
oversee its work. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3(e) (2012), with implementing 
regulation at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1(b)(3) (2017) and complementary listing 
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Exemplar Companies retaining compensation consultants 
almost exactly mirrors the percentage of all large public 
companies using such consultants.77 
Federal regulations require that companies describe the 
role that compensation consultants play.78 None of the four 
Exemplar Companies that reported employing a 
compensation consultant described the consultant’s tasks as 
including an evaluation of the personality of the company’s 
CEO.79 None of them reported asking the consultant to 
collect and summarize information on the CEO’s personal 
financial circumstances.80 None of them reported seeking 
advice from the consultant about tailoring compensation to 
the CEO’s wealth or aversion to risk in personal financial 
affairs or the CEO’s reaction to complexity in 
compensation.81 
Shareholders at each public company express their views 
on compensation by voting for or against “say-on-pay” 
resolutions (“SOPRs”), by which companies ask owners for 
approval of the pay to their NEOs.82 Even though the votes 
 
standards at NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(c)(iii) 
(2017) and NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5605(d)(3)(C) (2017). 
77 NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS, 2015–2016 NACD PUBLIC COMPANY 
GOVERNANCE SURVEY 4 (2015) (report compiled from 1034 public company 
responses, supplemented by data compiled by Equilar, a company that 
collects and organizes executive compensation information); id. at 17 (the 
boards at 79% of companies with capitalization of $10 billion or more—and 
from which responses to this question were obtained—reported receiving a 
presentation from a compensation consultant). 
78 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e)(3)(iii) (2017). 
79 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 47–48; Intel 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, 
supra note 18, at 42; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 48. 
80 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 47–48; Intel 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, 
supra note 18, at 42; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 48. 
81 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 47–48; Intel 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 22; Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, 
supra note 18, at 42; J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 48. 
82 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (2012), with implementing regulations at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(3), § 240.14a-21 (2017). 
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are non-binding, companies pay attention to the results, and 
a company may change its executive compensation 
arrangements when the percentage of shares voted in favor 
of its SOPR falls below 70%.83 Proxy advisory firms influence 
the votes of many institutional investors on these 
resolutions.84 Since companies know this to be so, many of 
them attempt to design their pay schemes so that proxy 
advisers will support their SOPRs.85 
 
83 A study of 2011 votes on say-on-pay found that 55% of the 
companies whose resolutions garnered an ISS negative recommendation 
that year made changes in their compensation plans the next year in 
response to the vote, with the responsiveness well correlated to whether 
the percentage of shares voted against the resolution exceeded the 30% 
level identified by ISS as the level that should trigger particular concern. 
Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence 
from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 984–86 (2013). 
84 A study of votes in 2011 on say-on-pay resolutions found a negative 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) recommendation associated 
with an almost 25% increase in “no” votes and a negative recommendation 
by both ISS and Glass Lewis associated with a more than 38% increase in 
“no” votes. Id. at 951, 953. The study analyzed votes at 1275 firms in the 
S&P 1500, id. at 953, and controlled for the percentage of shares held by 
blockholders (i.e., owners with more than 5% of outstanding shares), as 
well as abnormal returns, CEO total pay, growth in CEO pay, and total 
percentage of institutional shareholding, id. at 975–77. 
85 A survey of 110 companies in late 2011 found that 70% of 
“compensation programs were influenced by the guidance received from 
proxy advisory firms or by the policies of those firms.” David F. Larcker et 
al., The Conference Bd., The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting 
Recommendations on Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation 
Decisions, DIRECTOR NOTES FROM THE CONFERENCE BOARD, Mar. 2012, at 3, 
4. And many companies regularly themselves, or with the help of outside 
consultants, run their top executive compensation through models 
simulating the models that the major proxy advisors employ to help 
determine whether to recommend a vote for or against a company’s SOPR. 
MERIDIAN, 2013 TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 59, at 9 
(“In 2013, the majority of respondents (73%) replicated ISS’s quantitative 
Pay-for-Performance tests in order to prepare for ISS’s evaluation.”). 
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The two most powerful proxy advisory firms are ISS and 
Glass Lewis.86 Both employ a long and complex analysis to 
determine whether to recommend voting for or against each 
public company’s SOPR.87 Both base their recommendations 
significantly on ratios and equations.88 Both hunt for specific 
contract provisions that the proxy advisor deems 
questionable.89 Both set out preferred compensation 
 
86 ISS clients manage $25 trillion in assets and Glass Lewis clients 
manage $15 trillion. LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 
25, at 364. 
87 See ISS, 2015 U.S. COMPENSATION POLICIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 14–33 (2015) [hereinafter ISS 2015 FAQ COMPENSATION]; ISS 
PAY/PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT, supra note 64; GLASS LEWIS 2015 
GUIDELINES, supra note 64. 
88 In 2015, ISS used a model with three screens: (i) “Relative Degree 
of Alignment,” which “compare[d] the percentile ranks of a company’s CEO 
pay and [total shareholder return] performance, relative to an industry-
and-size derived comparison group, annualized for the prior three fiscal 
year periods”; (ii) “Multiple of Median,” which “expresse[d] the prior year’s 
CEO pay as a multiple of the median pay of its comparison group for the 
same period”; and (iii) “Pay-TSR Alignment,” which was an “absolute 
measure compar[ing] the trends of the CEO’s annual pay and the value of 
an investment in the company over the prior five-year period.” ISS 2015 
FAQ COMPENSATION, supra note 87, at 15. Glass Lewis’ “model 
benchmark[ed] . . . executives’ pay and company performance against 
peers selected using Equilar’s market-based peer groups and across five 
performance metrics. By measuring the magnitude of the gap between two 
weighted-average percentile rankings (executive compensation and 
performance), [Glass Lewis] grade[d] companies based on a school letter 
system: ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘F,’ etc.” GLASS LEWIS 2015 GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 
28. 
89 ISS looked for such pay arrangements as “[c]ontracts containing 
multi-year guarantees for salary increases, non-performance based 
bonuses, or equity compensation,” “[i]nclusion of performance-based equity 
or other long-term awards in the pension calculation,” “[c]hange in control 
cash payments exceeding 3 times base salary plus target/average/last paid 
bonus,” and “[d]ividends or dividend equivalents paid on unvested 
performance shares or units.” ISS 2015 FAQ COMPENSATION, supra note 
87, at 29–30. Glass Lewis looked for such “problematic contractual 
payments, . . . as guaranteed bonuses,” GLASS LEWIS 2015 GUIDELINES, 
supra note 64, at 27, and “egregious pay practices” like “large one-off 
payments [or] the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion.” Id. at 28. 
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practices, some quite prescriptive.90 But neither the ISS nor 
Glass Lewis analysis says a word about the personalities or 
financial circumstances of individual CEOs. 
In sum, while each company creates its own 
compensation package for its CEO and while the packages, 
though sharing complexity, are each somewhat different, the 
companies do not tailor compensation to the psychological 
traits and financial circumstances of their top executives. 
The companies do not ask the experts they hire to so tailor 
that compensation. The experts advising the shareholders do 
not evaluate CEO compensation to determine whether the 
pay package fits the individual. 
B. Why the Failure Renders CEO Compensation 
Irrational 
Motivation is inherently individual. Intuitively, we sense 
that what motivates one person effectively may not motivate 
another, or may motivate him or her but poorly. Gut instinct 
counsels that designing a scheme to motivate a man or 
woman without taking into account that individual’s 
personality and financial circumstances is unlikely to yield 
optimal results. 
Theorists have thought about executive compensation, 
and researchers have studied it, for decades. While their 
models and findings support different design features of 
modern CEO pay, this Article concentrates on the virtual 
consensus that whether a given kind or amount of 
compensation motivates well or not depends critically on the 
characteristics and financial condition of the individual 
executive who receives the pay. 
This subpart shows, first, that different executives react 
differently to pay complexity. It demonstrates, second, that 
 
90 See supra note 64 (noting ISS opposition to use of a single metric in 
either short-term or long-term incentive formulae). Glass Lewis favored, 
for short-term incentives, “a mix of corporate and individual performance 
measures” and, for long-term incentives “[p]erformance periods of at least 
three years” and “[t]wo or more performance metrics.” GLASS LEWIS 2015 
GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 28–29. 
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the value of contingent equity varies according to an 
individual executive’s personal financial risk aversion and 
the proportion of his or her wealth already comprised of 
company equity. It argues, third, that the amount of 
company equity an executive owns profoundly affects 
whether an additional grant of contingent equity increases 
the alignment of the executive’s interests with those of other 
shareholders. Finally, the subpart observes that an 
individual executive’s total wealth may have a profound 
impact on whether the financial incentives available to a 
company can motivate the executive at all. 
1. Individual Response to Complexity in 
Compensation 
The complexity of modern CEO compensation described 
in Part II can produce at least two problems. First, 
complexity can so degrade the executive’s confidence in the 
connection between his or her decisions and the pay he or 
she receives that the complexity itself reduces both the value 
that the executive attributes to the pay package and 
motivation that the package provides. Second, laundry lists 
of metrics can load a pay package with a dozen or more 
variables, each of which will affect a CEO’s pay very slightly, 
and may distract the executive rather than incentivize. In 
each case, the personality of the executive determines 
whether the complexity works to the paying company’s 
advantage or disadvantage. 
a. Complexity and Executive Confidence in the 
Connection Between Decisions and Pay 
Results 
Behavioral theory concentrates on an officer’s “perception 
of the (subjectively calculated) value of an incentive award,” 
which “will typically be less than the award’s (objectively 
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calculated) economic value”91 “for reasons of economic 
psychology . . . rather than rational choice.”92 Behaviorists 
posit that the worth of an incentive payment to the executive 
depends on that particular executive’s beliefs about a series 
of connections: CEO action → company performance → 
incentive reward → value of that reward.93 Whether an 
incentive motivates depends on the executive’s confidence 
that (i) the connections exist at all, (ii) the connections are 
strong, and (iii) the executive can successfully estimate that 
strength. For some executives, complexity can reduce that 
confidence, and thereby reduce the subjective value that he 
or she places on the incentive and the motivation it instills. 
For example, consider Mr. Moorman in 2014. His annual 
bonus at NSC depended 50% on the company’s operating 
income, 35% on its operating ratio, and 15% on a composite 
service measure, which itself depended 30% on adherence to 
operating plan, 30% on connection performance, and 40% on 
train performance.94 For purposes of the annual incentive 
 
91 ALEXANDER PEPPER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES: 
NEW DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR EXECUTIVE PAY 33 (2015) [hereinafter PEPPER, 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK] (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 61. 
93 Theorists express this connection in an equation and with academic 
terms. See Alexander Pepper & Julie Gore, The Economic Psychology of 
Incentives: An International Study of Top Managers, 49 J. WORLD BUS. 
350, 352 (2014) [hereinafter Pepper & Gore, Psychology of Incentives 
Article]. Of course, a board might use a complex formula to measure a 
CEO’s performance rather than to motivate particular decisions, in which 
case the effect on incentives would be either irrelevant or incidental. But 
that is not why companies use these complicated systems. They are 
explicitly incentives. Thus, NSC called its annual award to Mr. Moorman 
an “Annual Incentive,” with the company “set[ting] performance levels 
required to achieve 100% of the annual incentive opportunity so that the 
full bonus is only earned in years where our results are exceptional.” NSC 
2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 55. Similarly, the company called 
all of its equity compensation “Long-Term Incentive Awards,” explaining 
that it “allocated 2014 long-term incentive awards 35% as stock options, 
15% as restricted stock units, and 50% as performance share units.” Id. at 
56. 
94 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 54–56. 
FISHER –FINAL  
No. 2:599] TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE 627 
payment, NSC measured each of these variables over the 
single year for which NSC was awarding the bonus.95 Mr. 
Moorman’s PSUs, on the other hand, depended on rolling 
three-year cycles, with the number of shares transferred to 
Mr. Moorman at the end of each cycle depending (i) 50% on 
return on invested capital during the cycle’s three years and 
(ii) 50% on NSC’s TSR over those three years, compared with 
the TSR for comparable railroads, or alternatively, with the 
TSR for the S&P 500.96 
Now think whether Mr. Moorman could confidently draw 
a straight line between an executive decision that he faced 
and the value he personally would reap from his 
compensation package. Suppose that, at the beginning of 
2014, Mr. Moorman considered whether to either (a) make a 
major capital investment in new locomotives and freight cars 
to replace locomotives and cars (“rolling stock”) in the NSC 
fleet,97 or (b) not to make that investment. To simplify 
discussion, assume immediate delivery of the new rolling 
stock. Further, assume that this capital investment (i) would 
not lead to an increase in railroad revenue in the current 
year but would lead to an increase in future years; (ii) would 
increase depreciation expense in the current and future 
years; (iii) would not reduce maintenance expenses in the 
current year (as employees would have to devote time to 
learning new maintenance protocols), but would reduce 
maintenance expenses in future years; and (iv) would 
increase average invested capital in the current and future 
years.98 
The complicated performance formulae determining Mr. 
Moorman’s annual bonus and the number of shares he 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 57–59. 
97 At the end of 2014, NSC owned more than 4200 locomotives and 
more than 71,000 freight cars. NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K9. 
98 See id. at K35 (“As a capital-intensive company, we have most of 
our capital invested in such property. The replacement cost of these assets, 
as well as the related depreciation expense, would be substantially greater 
than the amounts reported on the basis of historical cost.”). 
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ultimately would receive from PSU grants could only affect 
Mr. Moorman’s decision on this possible capital investment if 
Mr. Moorman knew the effect of his decision on that bonus 
and on the number of shares he ultimately would obtain 
through his PSU grants. If he did not know how the decision 
would affect his compensation, then the formulae 
determining that effect could not guide his decision. In that 
event, at least with respect to this particular decision, the 
incentives would be useless. 
Under the assumptions set out above, there is a good 
chance that in 2014, Mr. Moorman would have had little 
confidence that he could predict the effect of his decision on 
his incentive compensation. If he decided to buy the new 
rolling stock, that capital investment would decrease the 
company’s operating income and increase its operating ratio 
in the current year.99 Both of those numerical changes would 
decrease Mr. Moorman’s annual bonus for 2014. But the 
capital investment might improve connection and train 
performance, which would in turn increase Mr. Moorman’s 
2014 cash bonus. Mr. Moorman would therefore need to 
perform a multidimensional computation to determine the 
net effect on his annual 2014 cash incentive payment of the 
decision to buy the new locomotives and freight cars. Of 
course, looking ahead to future years, he would have to 
estimate the effect of the capital investment on his annual 
cash incentive payments in those later annual cycles. The 
effect on those more distant payments would be different 
than the effect in 2014, as the new rolling stock would 
decrease maintenance costs in those years, and hopefully 
contribute to better service that would increase revenue. 
Thus, operating income would increase and, together with 
 
99 Under these assumptions, the investment does not affect 
maintenance or increase revenues in the first year but does increase 
depreciation, which has the net effect of reducing operating income. See 
infra note 278 . Since the increase in depreciation increases the numerator 
in the calculation of operating ratio, see infra note 279, and since the 
investment does not increase revenue in the first year (the denominator in 
the ratio), the net effect is to increase the ratio. 
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lower maintenance costs, drive the operating ratio down. But 
whether those gains would swamp the effect of the increased 
depreciation cost—which would continue to drag down 
operating income and increase operating ratio—might well 
be unclear. 
Complex and uncertain as these calculations would be, 
they would only begin Mr. Moorman’s quest to compute how 
buying new freight cars and locomotives would affect his 
overall compensation. Turning to his PSU grants, he would 
have to consider each of the three-year PSU cycles then 
underway. For each cycle, Mr. Moorman would have to 
consider how the investment would affect each of the two 
variables that determined the number of NSC shares he 
would receive from the grants.100 The increase in invested 
capital and decrease in net income (from increased 
depreciation) would decrease return on invested capital 
(“ROIC”) in the current year; but the new rolling stock could 
decrease maintenance costs and, if the improved rolling 
stock attracted more freight business in later years, increase 
revenue. Those two financial effects might overwhelm the 
effect of the increased depreciation and increased invested 
capital. If Mr. Moorman forecasted that result, he might 
anticipate that the purchase of the new locomotives and 
freight cars would 
• decrease the average ROIC in the three-year cycle 
coming to an end in the current year and thereby 
decrease the number of shares Mr. Moorman would 
have received from the PSU grant based on ROIC 
performance during that cycle had he decided against 
making the investment; 
 
100 Indeed, three variables, as in the years before 2014, NSC split the 
PSU grants into three different pieces, with one of them determined by 
operating ratio—an additional complexity omitted here. NSC Form, Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF 14A) 42–45 (Mar. 19, 2014). The company 
eliminated that metric from the performance share formula in 2015, on 
the ground that use of it there was duplicative of its use in computing the 
annual cash incentive award. NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, 
at 33, 50. 
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• have little or no effect on the average ROIC in the 
three-year cycle coming to an end next year (because 
the investment would lower ROIC in one of those 
three years and raise it in another), thus having little 
or no net effect on the number of shares Mr. Moorman 
would receive from the PSU grant based on ROIC 
performance during that cycle; and 
• increase ROIC in the three-year cycle that had just 
begun (because the investment would lower the ROIC 
in the current year but increase it during the next two 
years) and thereby increase the number of shares Mr. 
Moorman would receive during that cycle based on 
ROIC performance.101 
If the PSU scheme is to affect Mr. Moorman’s decision to 
buy or not buy the new rolling stock, he would have to 
perform the same multicycle computation for the other PSU 
variable—NSC TSR relative to that of other North American 
Class I Railroads and the S&P 500. Again, the investment 
could have differing effects on Norfolk Southern’s TSR in the 
differing cycles. Beyond that, Mr. Moorman would have to 
include in his calculations a dynamic variable—whether the 
other North American Class I Railroads might make a 
similar investment—which could affect their TSRs and 
thereby affect NSC’s TSR performance relative to that of the 
other railroads. 
After calculating (or at least estimating) both the effect of 
the locomotive and freight car purchase on his annual bonus 
and the effect of that investment on the shares he would 
receive from each of the three ongoing three-year PSU cycles, 
Mr. Moorman would have still more work to perform. He 
would have to project the effect of the capital investment on 
the per-share price of NSC stock. And he would have to 
consider how developments apart from the capital 
investment would likely affect the price of NSC stock, which 
 
101 This assumes very large benefits in years two and three, providing 
a relatively short-term payoff for a long-term investment. 
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would introduce additional uncertainty.102 For the price of 
that stock would determine the value of each share his PSU 
awards ultimately would yield, as well as the value of the 
restricted shares that would vest in future years, and the 
value of his options (both vested and unvested), with 
differing exercise prices. 
As this discussion demonstrates, Mr. Moorman would 
find it quite difficult to calculate the overall effect on his 
compensation from buying new locomotives and freight cars. 
If he had no significant confidence that he could make an 
accurate calculation, then complex incentives would fail to 
guide his decision. The whole intricate scheme would be 
irrelevant. Even if he had some confidence in at least a rough 
calculation of the capital investment decision’s impact on the 
value of his pay package, the power of the incentives to guide 
his decision would depend on the strength of that confidence. 
The incentives’ power would decrease as Mr. Moorman’s 
uncertainty about his decision’s effect on his compensation 
increased, and as the range of the possible impact 
broadened. 
Turning back from this concrete example to theory, 
behaviorists would say that Mr. Moorman may have 
discounted his pay for all of this uncertainty. The theory 
predicts that such a discount for “uncertainty (i.e., 
indeterminable expected values)”103 would have been in 
 
102 Events support the view that the company’s share return was hard 
to predict. In 2015, NSC’s stock price was hurt by a decline in the demand 
for coal, and therefore for train service to haul coal, and falling oil prices, 
which reduced the costs of truck operation to a greater extent than they 
reduced the costs of rail transportation. See Zacks Equity Research, 
Railroad Headwinds: Low Coal Demand, Oil Price Slump, ZACKS (Aug. 26, 
2015), http://www.zacks.com/commentary/54729/railroad-headwinds-low-
coal-demand-oil-price-slump.html [https://perma.cc/P4ZB-BVRS]. But the 
stock price was helped by a takeover bid. See Reem Nasr, Norfolk 
Southern, Canadian Pacific Shares Jump Amid Deal Report, CNBC (Nov. 
10, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/09/norfolk-southern-canadian-
pacific-shares-jump-amid-deal-report.html [https://perma.cc/DUM3-QJ5S]. 
103 Pepper & Gore, Psychology of Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 
355; PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 61 (“[T]he 
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addition to his discount for risk aversion.104 The discount 
would have derived from Mr. Moorman’s subjective 
assessment that the nuanced incentives were not worth 
much to him as a decision-making tool because he could not 
use them in any reasonably certain predictive way to turn 
his decisions into personal monetary gain. He may have 
looked at the incentive package as largely a lottery and, 
while confident that it would yield some large amount 
regardless of his decisions, discounted significantly the 
marginal value that his individual decisions would have 
upon the package’s ultimate value. 
Any such discount, of course, imposes a cost on a company 
and affects the ability of the compensation package to 
motivate. For example, if a company intends by its pay 
package to transfer $X in value to its CEO and the CEO 
subjectively discounts the compensation by 20% due to its 
complexity, the company must increase the objective value of 
the compensation to 1.25 $X in order to transfer the desired 
amount. The discount will also mean that compensation at 
objective value $X will provide only .8 $X in motivation. 
Research supports the notion that some executives 
discount their complex incentive pay precisely in this way. 
In-depth interviews by Alexander Pepper of fifteen senior 
executives in the United Kingdom yielded the comment by 
one CEO that “[d]eferred share schemes are basically 
somewhat poorly understood, . . . pretty arbitrary,” and, 
these days, “extraordinarily complex.”105 Interviewees 
identified use of “comparative performance measures, such 
 
subjectively perceived value of long-term incentives is systematically 
underestimated by senior executives” by reason of, among other things, 
“uncertainty aversion.”); id. at 76 (defining uncertainty as indeterminable 
expected values). 
104 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 68. 
105 Id. at 18. Pepper describes the exploratory study as consisting of 
semi-structured interviews with “15 senior executives from companies in 
the FTSE 350.” Id. at 15. The FTSE 350 is an index of “large and mid cap 
stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which pass screening 
for size and liquidity.” FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE 350 FACTSHEET (Apr. 28, 
2017). 
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as relative total shareholder return” as a particular 
problem.106 As one CEO observed: “I don’t know how to 
manage relative TSR . . . you don’t wake up in the morning 
trying to manage something relative.”107 Putting it another 
way, relative TSR was out of the executives’ “line of sight” 
that “link[s] . . . effort, performance, and reward.”108 
A larger study by Pepper, consisting of survey responses 
in October and November 2011 from 756 top managers in 
more than fifteen countries,109 showed that the executives, 
considered as a group, exhibited some degree of aversion to 
“uncertainty.” Pepper measured uncertainty by three 
questions and found that many CEOs preferred 
(i) compensation packages with a fixed point probability for a 
fixed dollar future bonus over packages offering the same 
fixed dollar future bonus but subject to a range of 
probabilities (some below the fixed point and some above); 
(ii) packages with a guaranteed fixed dollar future bonus 
over packages with a guaranteed fixed number of shares 
delivered in a known period, but with no guarantee of share 
price when the shares would be conveyed; and (iii) packages 
with a fixed dollar future bonus that would be triggered by a 
percentage change in company performance in excess of a 
percentage change in the Retail Price Index over packages 
with a bonus paid in a number of shares determined by their 
companies’ TSR relative to the TSR of comparable 
companies, and with no guarantee of the price of the shares 
when conveyed.110 An augmented survey that 
 
106 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 18. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 21. 
109 Id. at 63–64. Pepper defined “top managers” to be “very senior 
executives who are responsible for defining and executing a firm’s 
strategy, who through their actions are capable of affecting the company’s 
profits, share price, reputation and market positioning.” Id. at 36. These 
include the CEO, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer. Id. For 
a further description of the survey, see Pepper & Gore, Psychology of 
Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 353. 
110 The three questions designed to test for uncertainty aversion are: 
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1. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which 
of the following choices would you prefer? 
A. 50% chance of winning $5,250; otherwise nothing. 
B. A chance P% of winning $5,250 where P is 
unknown but is expected to be somewhere 
between 25% and 75%. 
C. I am indifferent between A and B. 
2. Given that the annual bonus of a senior executive in a 
large company is around $45,000 and the median long-
term incentive award is around $67,500 a year, which of 
the following choices would you prefer? 
A. A guaranteed bonus of $45,000 payable in three 
years’ time. 
B. A guaranteed bonus of 10,000 shares deliverable 
in three years’ time. The current share price is 
$4.50. In the past 12 months the share price has 
fluctuated between $2.25 and $6.75. 
C. I am indifferent between A and B. 
3. Given the same facts as question [2] . . . , which of the 
following would you prefer? 
A. A cash bonus of up to $52,500 payable in three 
years’ time provided that your employing 
company’s earnings per share during the period 
grows at least 3% in excess of the Retail Price 
Index. 
B. A bonus of up to 11,650 shares deliverable in 
three years’ time, depending upon the company’s 
relative total shareholder return over the period 
compared with a basket of comparable 
companies. The current share price is $2.95. In 
the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated 
between $2.50 and $3.75. In previous years bonus 
payments have ranged between 62% and 72% of 
target. 
C. I am indifferent between A and B. 
PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 65–66, 75–76, 
145–46. Pepper adjusted the amounts of money in the questions depending 
on survey respondents’ statements of how much money they made 
($350,000 or less per year in total compensation; between $350,000 and 
$725,000; and $725,000 or more). Id. at 65–67, 144. The amounts in the 
questions above were those in the survey provided to the lowest income 
cohort. Id. at 144–46. Note that the theoretically modeled value of choice B 
in the second question was $45,000 at the time of the gamble even though, 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) conducted in conjunction 
with Pepper111 yielded the same conclusion.112 
While the group results are interesting, the most 
pertinent point here is that, not surprisingly, different 
executives answered differently. In fact, the distributions of 
the individual answers to the three questions designed to 
test uncertainty aversion were very close—particularly when 
the sample was segmented and only the responses of those 
who had long-term incentive plans were considered. The 
following tables113 show the breakdown from the 2011 study: 
 
 
of course, the recipient of the gamble could win more or less depending on 
where the stock price finished at the end of the three years. Id. at 66 
(using a Black-Scholes model, a risk-free rate of return of 1%, stock 
volatility of 50%, no dividends, and a nominal strike price as this is 
essentially service-based restricted stock). Hence, the choice of A over B 
was a choice of certainty over uncertainty, not a choice of expected value. 
111 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INT’L LTD., MAKING EXECUTIVE PAY 
WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES 16 (2012) [hereinafter PWC 
SURVEY] (describing three questions substantially identical to those in 
supra note 110). The PwC study obtained responses from 1106 executives 
in forty-three countries. Id. at 2. Professor Pepper advised the author that 
the “bigger N, used in the PwC report, contains a convenience sample top-
up in order to obtain coverage across all the PwC countries interested in 
the report” and that “the statistical results, as between the larger and 
smaller samples, gave, in terms of statistical significance etc., the same 
results.” Email from Alexander Pepper to author (Mar. 8, 2016) (on file 
with author). 
112 PWC SURVEY, supra note 111, at 17. 
113 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 69–70 
(providing results reproduced in Tables 2 and 3 here). 
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TABLE 2. 
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 Thus, in every case—for every question and both for the 
full set of respondents and the subset who had long-term 
incentive plans already (and therefore presumably had a 
better understanding of them)—more than 35% of 
respondents favored the uncertain alternative that provided 
either a chance of a higher percentage of a given payout or a 
chance of a higher payout. Focusing on the respondents with 
 
114 Id. at 65–66, 75–76, 145–46; see also supra notes 91 & 110 
(containing the three questions). 
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long-term incentive plans common for CEOs at U.S. publicly 
traded companies, the respondents on the three questions 
split roughly 46% favoring more certainty, 42% favoring 
more uncertainty, and 11.5% indifferent. Thus, the message 
these numbers suggests is not that all companies should 
decrease the complexity of the compensation schemes they 
provide to their executives, but that whether complexity 
increases or decreases an incentive effect, or changes it at 
all, depends on the particular executive whom the company 
has hired. For example, the Pepper study suggests that a 
given executive has more than a 46% chance of being averse 
to uncertainty.115 Thus, a company considering a complex 
scheme should attempt to determine whether the individual 
executive whose pay the company is constructing falls within 
this 46%. If so, the company may conclude that a complicated 
payout scheme will lose a considerable amount of its power 
to incentivize this executive and will be, in fact, worth less to 
this CEO than the package costs the company. If so, the 
company should choose a simpler compensation package. 
On the other hand, the Pepper study also suggests a 42% 
chance that a given executive will embrace complexity and 
an 11.5% chance that a given executive is indifferent to 
complexity.116 Thus, a company considering a complex 
scheme should attempt to determine whether the individual 
executive whose pay the company is constructing may be 
among one of these two groups. If so, the company should 
proceed with a pay scheme as complex as other 
considerations suggest is appropriate. 
Because Pepper’s work included executives who were not 
CEOs and his sample drew from executives in many 
different countries, the numbers from his study cannot be 
 
115 The average of the percentages favoring more certainty among the 
respondents with long-term incentive plans—column A of Table 3—is 
46.13%. 
116 The averages of the percentages, among the respondents with 
long-term incentive plans, of those favoring uncertainty with a chance of a 
better payoff, and those indifferent to uncertainty—columns B and C of 
Table 3—are 42.4% and 11.5% respectively. 
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applied uncritically to CEOs in the United States.117 
However, disaggregated, the data show that the uncertainty 
aversion for executives in the United States was close to the 
results in the study overall,118 and close to 39% of the sample 
were CEOs or equivalents.119 Consequently, although the 
percentage distribution for U.S. CEOs might be somewhat 
different from those discussed in the last several paragraphs, 
Pepper’s work suggests with considerable force that a 
substantial number of American CEOs fall into each of his 
categories: (i) averse to uncertainty in the relation between 
complicated incentives, their business decisions, and their 
pay; (ii) content with such uncertainty if the incentives 
include a chance for high payouts; and (iii) indifferent 
between pay packages that provide greater certainty but 
with lower payouts and pay packages that are more 
uncertain but that offer higher possible payouts. Putting it 
plainly, individuals differ. 
b. Complexity and Insignificant Rewards for 
Large Numbers of Measures and Tasks 
The previous subpart concerns instances where a CEO 
cannot confidently estimate how his or her decisions will 
affect future compensation under the CEO compensation 
plan. This subpart addresses instances in which a CEO 
knows that, whatever value some particular components of 
the package might ultimately deliver, the value added by 
those components will be insignificant to the executive’s total 
pay. 
The sheer number of variables determining the pay that 
the modern CEO receives—together with the weights 
assigned to them—strongly suggests that some variables do 
 
117 See supra note 109. 
118 Pepper computed an uncertainty aversion index for the 
subsamples from different countries. PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES 
BOOK, supra note 91, at 72–73. He computed the median index at -.09 and 
the U.S. index at -.10. Id. at 72–73. 
119 The table of job titles shows 38.8% of respondents were CEOs or 
presidents or managing directors, with another 8.0% chairmen. Id. at 149. 
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not provide a meaningful economic incentive at all. For 
example, 15% of Mr. Moorman’s 2014 annual cash incentive 
payment at NSC depended on a composite service measure 
that, in turn, depended 30% on a score measuring train 
connection performance.120 This meant that for 2014, the 
maximum amount that Mr. Moorman could receive for train 
connection performance (considering that his bonus 
opportunity was computed against 225% of his $1 million 
salary)121 was $101,250.122 While this seems a handsome 
amount to an ordinary individual, it comprised less than 1% 
of Mr. Moorman’s total 2014 compensation, which exceeded 
$13.5 million.123 
As it happened, in 2014 the entire composite service 
measure (including train connection performance, adherence 
to operating plan, and train performance) was below the 
threshold required for any award based on that measure.124 
Yet taking into account the other factors that weighed more 
heavily in the annual cash computation (operating income 
counting for 50%, and operating ratio counting for 35%),125 
Mr. Moorman’s cash incentive award was actually higher in 
2014 than the year before.126 In that sense, the poor score on 
the service measure did not punish him financially at all. 
To be clear, this analysis does not suggest that Mr. 
Moorman was unconcerned with train connections, train 
performance, or implementation of his railroad’s operating 
plan. His concern, however, most likely grew out of his forty 
years of railroad experience, which very probably fostered in 
 
120 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 55. 
121 Id. at 54, 62. 
122 $2,250,000 x .15 x .3. 
123 Computed by dividing the $101,250 by the $13,536,017 total 
compensation, shown at page 62 of NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 
12. 
124 Id. at 56. 
125 Id. at 55. 
126 Id. at 62 (showing the 2013 non-equity incentive plan 
compensation to be $1,685,250 and the comparable figure for 2014 as 
$1,813,500). 
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him a commitment to keep NSC’s trains running well, on 
time, and according to plan.127 The point is that he very 
likely was not motivated, beyond that experience-based 
concern, to pay any more attention to train connection, train 
performance, and operating plan by what amounted to small 
percentage additions or subtractions to his total 
compensation, which total would be determined 
predominantly by other factors to which his complicated 
compensation formula gave greater weight. 
The compensation arrangements at Intel raise the same 
issue. Operational performance determined 50% of the Intel 
CEO’s annual cash incentive award for 2014.128 But Intel 
calculated the score for that factor as “the corporate average” 
of the company’s business unit scores, “subject to a corporate 
level ‘kicker’ of 5%.”129 In turn, the corporate average derived 
from the scores of ten different business units, each of which 
had three or four operational goals.130 As examples, “PC 
client billing volume” was one of four operational goals for 
the PC Client Group and “Comms development: SoFIA 
schedule” was one of four operational goals for the Platform 
Engineering Group.131 Altogether, the ten business units had 
thirty-two operational goals.132 Assuming that each of the 
scores for the ten business groups was equally weighted and 
that each operational goal within a business unit was 
equally weighted within that business unit, then PC client 
billing volume determined one-quarter of one-tenth of one-
half of the CEO’s cash bonus—that is, 1.25% of the annual 
 
127 William C. Vantuono, 2011 Railroader of the Year: Wick Moorman, 
Norfolk Southern, RAILWAY AGE (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/freight/class-i/2011-railroader-of-
the-year-wick-moorman-norfolk-southern.html [https://perma.cc/FLV3-
AST2] (interview with Moorman in which he states that he first went to 
work for the company in 1975). 
128 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 44. 
129 Id. at 57. 
130 Id. at 58. 
131 Id. at 57–58. 
132 Id. at 58. 
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cash incentive to the CEO. That translated into about 
$40,268,133 which in turn was less than one-half of 1% of the 
CEO’s total compensation.134 
Again, this analysis does not imply that the Intel CEO 
was unconcerned about PC client billing volume. It strongly 
suggests, however, that his concern was not prompted by 
financial reward or punishment through the compensation 
scheme, which was so fragmented that this lightly weighted 
individual component could not significantly affect his pay. 
Of course, it is possible that even small rewards for a long 
list of goals might motivate as to each of the small goals—for 
psychological reasons rather than monetary reasons. But 
that depends on individual psychology. Thus, some top 
officers might fret seriously over a low score on any 
measure—no matter how many there are, no matter how 
small the weight the compensation formula attributes to 
each, and no matter how small the payment each generates. 
For such a CEO, each small part of the pay package 
motivates. Other CEOs might ignore a lengthy list and 
concentrate on one or more measures that both (i) seem 
better able to grade company performance overall, like stock 
price performance and dividends; and (ii) are more important 
to the CEO financially, as will be the stock price if the 
executive has shares of company stock worth millions of 
dollars.135 Whether small payments for multiple, subdivided 
performance measures do any good depends on the 
individual CEO. 
 
133 Intel paid cash incentives to the CEO totaling $3,354,400, 
$3,221,400 of which was annual incentive cash (the rest being quarterly 
incentive cash). Id. at 53, 54. One and one-quarter percent of that annual 
incentive is $40,267.50. 
134 Intel reported providing total compensation to its CEO valued at 
$11,197,400. Id. at 53. Dividing $40,267 by that number yields 0.0036. 
While the percentage would be larger if the operational goal had been one 
of only three goals for a business group, it would still have been under one-
half of 1% of total pay (1/3 of 1/10 of 1/2 is 0.0167, which multiplied by the 
$3,221,400 annual cash incentive payment yields $53,797.38, which 
divided by $11,197,400, yields 0.0048). 
135 See Table 3, infra notes 183–201. 
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The potential harm from manifold measures similarly 
depends on individual personality. Thus, some CEOs might 
obsess over a perfect or near-perfect score across all the 
measures in their pay schemes and might therefore devote 
too much attention to each of so many different specific goals 
that this effort detracts from their concentration on 
important strategic matters. Some CEOs might resent the 
implication that the board of directors believes that the CEO 
will somehow forget parts of the business unless he or she 
receives a small payment for devoting some time to each 
such part. Computations that include myriad variables 
having inconsequential impact on total pay could degrade 
the performance of these top executives. 
The message is not that including a large number of 
variables with low rewards is good or bad, but that whether 
doing so serves a company well or ill depends on the 
personality of the CEO receiving the pay. Without knowing 
that personality, the company that eschews this practice can 
miss an opportunity to motivate its top officer to keep his or 
her eye on a host of matters that are “drivers” of the 
company’s success.136 But, without knowing that personality, 
 
136 See LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 
229, stating: 
[O]ne way to select the measures used to award 
compensation is to use those that were identified during 
the business modeling process as being correlated with 
success in the corporate strategy. In general, these include 
a mix of accounting measures (such as economic value 
added, earnings-per-share growth, and return on assets), 
stock market measures (such as total shareholder return), 
and nonfinancial measures (such as customer satisfaction, 
product defect rates, and market share). 
But Larcker and Tayan follow this explanation with an exposition of the 
four financial and six nonfinancial metrics used in determining 2013 
annual performance bonuses for Northrop Grumman NEOs, adding the 
questions: “Are the large number of financial and nonfinancial measures 
in this annual bonus plan really necessary? When does a plan become too 
complicated?” Id. at 231; see also MICHAEL B. DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND 
OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 
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the company that includes a laundry list risks motivating 
resentment rather than performance, distracting CEO 
attention from critical company decisions, or simply 
producing a scheme that it can flourish to shareholders but 
which has no real impact because the CEO ignores it. 
2. Individual Valuation of Contingent Equity 
Awards 
Companies pay top executives in cash and equity. Equity 
dominates. When companies pay this form of compensation 
and ignore individual personality and financial 
circumstances, large and distinct problems follow. 
Equity comprised more than 50% of CEO pay at the 
Exemplar Companies in 2014. According to NSC’s summary 
compensation table, slightly more than 55% of Mr. 
Moorman’s 2014 compensation consisted of equity awards—
with those awards valued at cost to NSC as computed per 
accounting rules.137 So computed (with an adjustment in the 
JPM figure for a change in the year of one award), equity 
awards at the other four Exemplar Companies bulked 
similarly large in the total 2014 compensation paid to their 
CEOs: Intel (59%),138 Chevron (52%),139 J&J (55%),140 and 
JPM (55%).141 
 
250–51 (2014) (arguing that no score on any single measure should reward 
an executive with “enormous pay”); id. at 253–55 (using AutoZone, Inc. as 
an example, arguing that its then-current pay system should be replaced 
with “a carefully calibrated system of bonuses linked to a large number of 
metrics”); id. at 253 (suggesting a bonus calculation with weighted scores 
in seven different categories of factors “that AutoZone’s public filings 
singled out as being important to the company’s success”); id. at 253–55 
(many of which are subdivided into more than one variable, producing a 
total of twenty-three different metrics, eight of which would each count for 
only 1% or 2% of the total bonus payout). 
137 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 62 (adding the 
$4,879,422 in stock awards to the $2,624,976 option award, then dividing 
by the total compensation figure of $13,536,017). For the accounting rules, 
see infra notes 150–156. 
138 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 53 (dividing the 
$6,658,700 in stock awards by the $11,197,400 in total compensation). 
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These figures reflect the norm. For example, one 
commercial study of 2014 CEO pay at companies in the S&P 
1500 reported that top executives received on average 53% of 
their total compensation in equity.142 
The equity included in CEO compensation has only 
contingent value. That is, the ultimate value that the CEO 
realizes from the equity award is contingent on future 
events. Thus NSC granted Mr. Moorman an option award in 
2014 permitting him—after the options vested four years 
later and continuing thereafter for six years—to buy up to 
87,880 shares of NSC common stock at a price of $94.170 per 
share,143 the market price of NSC shares on the grant 
date.144 The value of these options was contingent upon 
whether the price of the company’s stock exceeds the $94.170 
per share exercise price during the period in which he would 
be able to exercise the options (2018–2024). Similarly, in 
2014 NSC granted Mr. Moorman an award of 11,950 shares 
of service-based restricted stock, vesting in five years.145 The 
value of those restricted shares was contingent on the price 
 
139 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 44 (adding the 
$4,816,500 in stock awards to the $8,586,240 option award, then dividing 
by the $25,970,417 in total compensation). 
140 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 54 (adding the 
$9,467,380 in stock awards to the $4,168,139 option award, then dividing 
by $24,989,306 in total compensation). 
141 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 44, 49 (dividing the 
$11,100,000 stock award by the total $20,000,000 compensation). The 
computation uses this figure instead of computing the percentage from the 
summary compensation table because the equity figures in the summary 
compensation table included some 2013 compensation due to the timing of 
awards. Id. at 58 n.5 to tbl. 
142 EQUILAR, 2015 CEO PAY STRATEGIES 9 fig.3 (providing figures for 
2014). “The S&P Composite 1500® combines three leading indices, the 
S&P 500®, the S&P MidCap 400®, and the S&P SmallCap 600® to cover 
approximately 90% of the U.S. market capitalization.” S&P DOW JONES 
INDICES, http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-composite-1500 [https:// 
perma.cc/EZC8-EF98] (last visited May 22, 2017). 
143 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 68. 
144 Id. at 56. 
145 Id. at 65. 
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of the company’s stock after the restrictions expired in 2019. 
In the same way, NSC granted Mr. Moorman PSUs in 2014 
that would transfer to him three years later some number of 
NSC shares determined by a complicated formula including 
average after-tax return on average invested capital over the 
three years, and NSC’s TSR relative to either the TSR for 
other railroads or the TSR for the S&P 500.146 The ultimate 
value of that award was contingent both on the performance 
measures that would determine how many shares he would 
receive at the end of the three-year performance cycle and on 
the market price of NSC stock at that time.147 
A very considerable body of theoretical and empirical 
work has demonstrated that the subjective value of such 
contingent equity awards to a CEO is lower than the 
objective cost of such awards to the company granting 
them.148 Moreover, the theory and empirical studies 
demonstrate that different CEOs discount the value of such 
awards—off the company cost—by different amounts, 
depending on their individual characteristics and 
circumstances.149 Thus, different executives will place 
different subjective values on the same equity grant. 
Accounting rules measure the cost to a company of the 
contingent equity it grants by the fair value that the 
company gives up when it makes the grant.150 The cost of a 
service-based restricted stock award is the market value of 
the company’s stock on the date of the grant, multiplied by 
the number of shares in the award,151 with the cost reduced 
 
146 Id. at 57. 
147 Id. 
148 See the remainder of this Part III.B.2, particularly notes 159–180 
infra and accompanying text. 
149 Id. 
150 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 1-13 (2d ed. July 2015) [hereinafter PWC, 
STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION] (“The fair value of an award is the cost to 
the company of granting the award and should reflect the estimated value 
that the company would be obligated to provide when an employee is 
entitled to the award . . . .”). 
151 Id. at 8-9. 
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to reflect an estimated (then trued up) forfeiture rate by 
failure to continue to work at the company through the 
vesting period.152 The cost of a time-vested stock option is the 
value of the option grant on the date of the grant, as 
determined by a mathematical model—either the Black-
Scholes model or the binomial model (also known as the 
lattice model).153 Both these models are based on (i) the price 
of the stock on the grant date, (ii) the exercise price for the 
option, and (iii) the following assumptions or estimates: (a) 
the expected term of the option (how long until actually 
exercised), (b) the volatility of the price of the underlying 
stock, (c) the risk-free interest rate, and (d) the expected 
dividend rate.154 Companies recognize the cost of an option 
 
152 Id. at 1-42 (“[C]ompanies are required to develop an assumption 
regarding the prevesting forfeiture rate beginning on the grant date, 
which will impact the estimated amount of compensation expense to be 
recorded over the requisite service period. Companies are required to true-
up forfeiture estimates for all awards with performance and service 
conditions through the vesting date so that compensation cost is 
recognized only for awards that vest.”) (citation omitted). The company 
recognizes the cost of a restricted stock grant over the vesting period. Id. 
at 8-9. 
153 Id. at 1-16, ch. 6. 
154 Id. at 7-2. The company recognizes the option expense, computed 
by the model, over the vesting period. Id. at 8-9. If an executive leaves a 
company after an option grant but before the option vests, the executive 
typically forfeits the option. KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 57. If 
the executive leaves the firm after the option vests but before it has 
expired, the executive typically must either exercise the option at or near 
the time of departure or forfeit the option. Id. If the executive remains 
with the company through the entire exercise period, the executive can 
exercise at any point during that period. PWC, STOCK-BASED 
COMPENSATION, supra note 150, at 7-4 (“Because employees typically 
cannot exercise an option until it vests, the vesting date represents the low 
end of the range of possible exercise dates, whereas the contractual term 
represents the high end of the possible range. An analysis of historical 
exercise and post-vesting cancellation behavior is generally used to 
estimate where within this range the exercise or post-vesting cancellation 
may occur. A company should use its relevant historical information, as 
listed above, for similar options and employee groups.”). The volatility of 
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grant over the vesting period, and that time-based 
recognition permits them to adjust cost if an executive leaves 
the company before the vesting period runs and thereby 
forfeits the option.155 The cost of a performance share award 
is the market value of the company’s stock on the date the 
company grants the award multiplied by the maximum 
number of possible shares that could be awarded, discounted 
for the probabilities that (i) different levels of performance 
will be achieved and (ii) the recipient will fail to continue to 
work at the company through the performance cycle.156 
Although the calculation of contingent equity cost to a 
company is complex, it is objective and based on observable 
facts. As long as these facts are the same from one company 
to another, the cost of the grant is the same. Moreover, the 
cost is real and concrete in the sense that each company 
must include the calculated cost of each contingent equity 
grant as part of reported compensation expense, which 
decreases its reported earnings.157 
Financial theory, however, identifies subtle complications 
in how the individual executive subjectively values 
contingent equity, depending on characteristics and 
circumstances peculiar to that individual. An understanding 
of the theory best begins with common sense. Intuitively, 
 
the stock is the standard deviation of the stock price, often estimated by 
historical volatility for the company or its peers. Id. at 7-23 to -26. 
155 PWC, STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 150, at 7-3 to -4 
(“[P]re-vesting forfeitures . . . are taken into account by the company 
recognizing compensation cost only for those awards for which employees 
render the requisite service.”). 
156 Id. at 1-22 to -24. The company recognizes the expense when it is 
probable that the required performance will be achieved—net of an 
estimate of pre-vesting forfeiture—reassessing that probability each 
reporting period, then trues-up at the end of the vesting period so that the 
total expense recognized reflects the actual number of shares awarded. Id. 
at 1-24, 1-26, 8-9. 
157 KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 66–69 (tracing the history, 
ending with FAS 123R, which now requires expensing option 
compensation); PWC, STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 150, at 1-2 
n.1 (after the codification of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, 
requirement for expensing located in ASC 718). 
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concentration of wealth in one or only a few assets is risky as 
it involves putting financial eggs into one, or just a few, 
baskets. More formally, a CEO may have undiversified 
wealth. A CEO usually owns equity in his or her company 
outright (that is, without contingencies), and thereby risks a 
decrease in that portion of investment wealth should a 
decline in the company’s economic fortunes result in a stock 
price decline. As the percentage of the executive’s investment 
wealth comprised of such equity increases, the executive’s 
economic well-being becomes more concentrated in the fate 
of the company, and his or her investment risk grows.158 In 
addition, different individuals display differing degrees of 
personal risk aversion; that is, aversion to risking either (i) 
decreases in personal wealth or (ii) increases in their wealth 
that are lower than expected or planned. 
All of this suggests that when a CEO with relatively high 
risk aversion already has a large percentage of investment 
wealth tied up in company equity, that CEO will 
substantially discount the value of additional contingent 
equity provided as compensation. It also suggests that 
different CEOs will subjectively discount the same contingent 
equity pay package differently, depending on their individual 
risk aversion and the proportion of investment wealth 
comprised of company equity before they receive the 
additional contingent equity award. If an award also 
provides that the executive will forfeit options or restricted 
stock if he or she leaves the company before vesting, 
different executives will have different discount rates on the 
same grant if they subjectively estimate different 
probabilities that they will depart before that time. 
 
158 Since he or she usually works exclusively for one company, the 
CEO has committed all of his or her human capital to that company and 
risks a decline in the return on that capital should the company’s economic 
fortunes decline to the point that it has to cut compensation. This 
circumstance aggravates the problems created by concentration of 
investment wealth in company equity, since the same events that could 
reduce the company’s ability to pay would likely also reduce the price of its 
stock. 
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Economists have for years worked with models that 
formalize these ideas.159 The results are quite startling. An 
early analysis discussed a hypothetical executive with 
wealth (exclusive of the option grant discussed next) worth 
$10,000,000, who was granted a ten-year option on 10,000 
shares of stock, with both the price of the stock at grant and 
at exercise equal to $50, with a 20% stock price variance, and 
an expected compounded stock return of 12% annually.160 
The Black-Scholes calculation (reflecting the cost to the 
company) valued the award at $351,260.161 Application of a 
model utility function showed that an executive with low 
proportional risk aversion and only 10% of his or her 
$10,000,000 wealth in company equity would subjectively 
value the option award at $321,500.162 However, the model 
showed that the value of the option award decreased if the 
hypothetical executive was more risk averse and held a 
higher percentage of investment wealth in company 
equity.163 At the highest relative risk aversion and with 90% 
of the $10,000,000 wealth tied up in company equity already, 
the executive would subjectively value the new option grant 
at only $19,700.164 
A later study, employing a slightly different model, 
hypothesized an executive who received a ten-year option on 
one share of stock.165 Assuming a $30/share stock price on 
the grant date, a $30/share exercise price, and 30% stock 
price volatility, the Black-Scholes method computed the cost 
of the option award to the company at $16.55.166 However, 
an executive with relatively low risk aversion and 50% of $5 
 
159 E.g., KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 87–88. 
160 Richard A. Lambert et al., Portfolio Considerations in Valuing 
Executive Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 129, 134 (1991). 
161 Id. at 135 tbl.1 n.a. 
162 Id. at 135 tbl.1. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified 
Executives, 33 J ACCT. & ECON. 3, 10 (2002). 
166 Id. at 12 tbl.1. 
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million wealth invested in company equity (holding the rest 
in cash) would, if rationally employing the posited utility 
function, value the option at only 63.5% of the Black-Scholes 
value (i.e., $10.51); and an executive with relatively high 
risk aversion and 67% of investment wealth already in 
company equity (again holding the rest of non-firm wealth in 
cash) would value the option at only 21.1% of the Black-
Scholes value (i.e., $3.49).167 
A third theoretical work provided discounts for both 
options and service-based restricted stock. The study 
assumed that a company granted an executive a five-year 
option on stock with a market price at $30/share, 30% 
market price volatility, and an expected return of 10%.168 If 
the exercise price equaled $30/share, the stock’s beta equaled 
1, the recipient executive had low relative risk aversion, and 
only 30% of his or her wealth in options, the executive would 
subjectively discount the Black-Scholes value of the option by 
34.5%.169 However, the executive would discount the Black-
Scholes value by 86.1% if all the conditions remained the 
same, except that the executive’s relative risk aversion 
doubled and the executive held 70% of his or her wealth in 
options.170 
This last work found a similar pattern, albeit with 
smaller variations, when the exercise price of the option 
dropped to zero—meaning that the option mimicked service-
based restricted stock, which the executive receives without 
paying anything to the company but simply by remaining 
employed through the vesting period.171 With all the 
 
167 Id. The authors defined the subjective value to the executive as the 
“certainty equivalence” of the option, which they described as “the amount 
of riskless cash compensation the executive would exchange for the 
option.” Id. at 9. 
168 Yisong S. Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of 
Executive Stock Options, 28 J. BANKING & FINANCE 1225, 1234 tbl.3 (2014). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 171 (2004) (explaining 
that restricted stock is an option with an exercise price of $0). 
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conditions in the last paragraph except an exercise price at 
zero, the low-risk-aversion executive with only 30% of wealth 
in company options would discount the value of the $30 in 
restricted stock by 7.2% off the Black-Scholes value, while 
the high-risk-aversion executive with 70% of wealth in 
company options would discount the restricted stock by 
28.4%.172 
Other academic analyses, using utility function models, 
confirm these results.173 Thus well-established financial 
theory suggests not only that executives discount future 
contingent equity by very significant amounts, but the 
amount of the discount will vary tremendously from one 
individual executive to another, depending on the personal 
characteristics of the particular executive—particularly his 
or her aversion to risk in personal financial affairs and the 
proportion of his or her wealth already committed to 
company equity. 
These theoretical studies are important because empirical 
work confirms that different executives, in fact, have 
differing degrees of risk aversion and differing percentages of 
their wealth invested in equity issued by their firms. Using 
data from a sample of 65,000 option exercises by 
approximately 7000 executives during the period from 1996 
to 2008, one study found implied risk aversion that varied 
from 0.110 at the 10th percentile, to 0.911 at the median, to 
6.170 at the 90th percentile.174 The United States does not 
 
172 Tian, supra note 168, at 1234 tbl.3. 
173 KOLB, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 25, at 87–88 (referencing some of 
the studies in the text, and others). 
174 Steffen Brenner, The Risk Preferences of U.S. Executives, 61 
MGMT. SCI. 1344, 1345, 1349 (2015) (describing sample); id. at 1346–48 
(describing the methodology by which the researcher derived implied risk 
aversion from option exercises); id. at 1350 tbl.4 (showing percentile 
distribution of derived risk aversions). The executives in the sample 
included CEOs as well as other high-ranking officers such as CFOs and 
executive vice presidents. Id. at 1350 tbl.3. Although the article did not 
separately provide a percentile distribution for the risk aversions derived 
from the 16,400 option exercises by CEOs in the sample, id. at 1350 tbl.3, 
it did identify the mean derived CEO risk aversion as 1.92, the median as 
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require that CEOs or other executives at publicly traded 
companies disclose their total personal wealth or the 
percentage of that wealth consisting of equity interests in 
their companies. But using a technique that estimates the 
amount of non-firm wealth, the same study that estimated 
executive risk aversion also derived the non-firm wealth for 
the 7000 executives.175 It found a wide range in the 
proportion of wealth that the executives held in the form of 
their firms’ stock.176 
Empirical studies that directly attempt to derive the 
subjective value of options and restricted stock also conclude 
that executives generally value options and restricted stock 
below the price of those compensation vehicles to their 
companies and that the degree of the discount depends 
critically on the characteristics of the individual.177 As one 
 
0.59 and the standard deviation as 5.50,  id. at 1351 tbl.5. The difference 
between the median and the mean, and the large standard deviation, 
substantiates a wide range of CEO risk aversion. 
175 Id. at 1349 (explaining the technique used). 
176 Id. at 1349 tbl.2 (reporting the mean ratio of non-firm to total 
wealth in the sample equal to 0.555, with a standard deviation of 0.239).  
177 In 2004, the Watson Wyatt consulting firm published the results of 
an online survey of high-income employees that, among other things, 
asked the employees to identify trade-offs between stock options at their 
companies and cash. WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, HOW DO EMPLOYEES 
VALUE STOCK OPTIONS? 5–6 (describing sample of 1000 respondents from 
more than 300 companies and describing methodology). Watson Wyatt 
then compared the difference between the cash equivalent, as identified by 
the survey respondents, and the value of the options, as computed using 
the Black-Scholes method. The employees generally valued options at a 
cash equivalent below the value of the options as computed by Black-
Scholes. Significantly for the discussion here, Watson Wyatt estimated 
that employees who were “conservative” investors on average discounted 
the options by 41% off the Black-Scholes value and that employees who 
were “aggressive” investors discounted the options by only 36%. Id. at 11 
tbl.4. Moreover, the average estimated discounts increased when Watson 
Wyatt increased the number of shares in the hypothetical grant from 100 
options to 500 options, with the estimated average discount applied by 
“conservative” investors increasing to 53% off the Black-Scholes value and 
the estimated average discount applied by “aggressive” investors 
increasing to 41%. Id. at 11 tbl.3. 
 
FISHER –FINAL  
No. 2:599] TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE 653 
researcher puts it, the empirical evidence “suggests that it is 
necessary to measure executives’ equity incentives from their 
personal perspective.”178 
Aggravating this problem, recent research by behavioral 
economists suggests that a significant proportion of 
executives discount future payouts (which include payouts 
with which this Article is concerned, from equity that can be 
converted into cash only after time vesting, or performance 
vesting over a multiyear performance cycle) at a far higher 
rate than financial theory would employ—with these 
discount rates, simply for delayed realization, up to or 
exceeding 30%.179 However, once again, individuals differ. In 
 
Using a similar method to determine the subjective value of restricted 
stock to survey participants, Watson Wyatt found that conservative 
investors discounted restricted stock by 22% off the grant date stock price, 
while the aggressive investors discounted restricted stock by 10%. Id. at 12 
tbl.5. Although Watson Wyatt did not provide the numbers, they reported 
that “[f]or larger grants, employees place a greater discount on the value of 
those [restricted] shares . . . .” Id. at 7. 
An unpublished study attempted to derive CEOs’ subjective value of 
their equity holdings in their companies by studying stock sales and option 
exercises during 1996–2005, with the sample covering 1651 individual 
CEOs over 9507 executive years. Christopher S. Armstrong, The Incentives 
of Equity-Based Compensation and Wealth 20–22 (Feb. 14, 2007), 
https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/accounting/papers/Chris%20Armstr
ong%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7329-DL7L]. The study concluded that “most 
executives subjectively value their equity holdings below the risk-neutral 
expected value which is consistent with risk aversion and lack of 
diversification affecting their valuations.” Id. at 44. 
178 Armstrong, supra note 177, at 44. 
179 Behavioral economists characterize these as “hyperbolic” rates. See 
Pepper & Gore, Psychology of Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 352 
(“Time effects are determined by a hyperbolic discount function . . . , 
rather than the more conventional exponential discounting function used 
in finance and discounted utility theory. Hyperbolic discounting has been 
extensively tested in experiments and in field research and is the 
dominant theory of inter-temporal choice favored by behavioral economists 
. . . .”) (citations omitted). The Pepper study, described in supra note 109 
and accompanying text, asked three questions to determine the time 
discounts that survey participants employed. PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 66, 70 tbl.4.1 (showing results of 
answers to three “Time” questions), 145. Pepper computed the median 
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fact, a large minority of respondents (more than one-third) 
selected answers to survey questions that did not imply an 
outsize discount rate.180 Behavioral theory would posit that 
the differences are driven by individual psychology. 
Taken altogether, the theory and empirical evidence show 
that the value one CEO subjectively places on a package of 
contingent equity incentives may differ from the value that a 
second CEO places on the same package. Further, the two 
values may be far apart if the two CEOs have significantly 
different degrees of risk aversion, and hold significantly 
different percentages of their total wealth in firm stock and 
stock derivatives. The variance increases further if one CEO 
discounts future economic benefit at the rate that rational 
economics suggests and the other discounts future benefits 
at a psychologically driven higher rate. This, in turn, means 
that—without knowing and considering the risk aversion of 
the particular individual who is the CEO at that company, or 
 
time discount rates for all participants at 33% and for participants who 
had long-term incentive plans at 32%. Id. at 70 tbl.4.1. The median 
discount rate for U.S. participants in the survey equaled 30.8%. Pepper & 
Gore, Psychology of Incentives Article, supra note 93, at 357 tbl.3. As 
Pepper and Gore put it: 
 According to standard financial theory, individuals should 
discount future receipts at rates which are consistent with 
the return on comparably risky future cash flows, adjusted 
for inflation. In the present case, time discount rates 
should, therefore, have been close to the risk-free rate of 
around 1% per annum, subject to local inflation, which in 
2011 varied between under 1% (Switzerland) to over 9% 
(Argentina) . . . . 
Id. at 355–56 (citation omitted). The PwC survey yielded similar results to 
virtually the same questions. PWC SURVEY, supra note 111, at 18–19 
(reciting questions and estimating a 31% discount rate for both 
participants overall and for the subset of North American participants). 
180 PEPPER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INCENTIVES BOOK, supra note 91, at 70 
tbl.4.1 (reporting the percentages who selected alternative B and who 
therefore did not employ hyperbolic discount rates when answering the 
three time questions as 35.1%/44.6%/36.0% for all respondents and 
38.4%/46.3%/36.2% for the subset of respondents with long-term incentive 
plans). 
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the distribution of that individual’s investments between 
company equity and other assets, and without knowing 
whether the individual subjectively applies a psychologically 
driven hyperbolic discount to future returns—a company 
cannot have even a reasonably approximate idea of how its 
CEO values his or her contingent equity incentive package. 
Accordingly, the company does not know if the subjective 
value of the package to the CEO is sufficient to motivate the 
CEO to take the actions that will cause the package to pay 
maximum rewards, or not. The company is flying blind. 
3. Individual Amount of Accumulated Equity 
The previous subpart discussed the effect of the 
percentage of a CEO’s wealth invested in company shares 
before the new grant on the value of an additional equity 
grant. But the absolute value of the accumulated equity a 
CEO holds—and the ratio of that absolute amount to a new 
contingent equity grant—has another profound implication. 
Finance academics pointed out years ago that top officers 
of public companies often hold so many shares of their 
companies’ stock that small changes in the per-share price of 
that stock can have a far greater impact on CEO wealth than 
all of the incentives provided by yearly compensation.181 That 
remains true today.182 To illustrate this phenomenon and to 
 
181 See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and 
Incentives: A Survey, 9 FRBNY POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 30 (citing 
studies to showing that the vast majority of a typical CEO’s incentives to 
increase stock price are driven by variation in the value of his stock and 
option portfolio, that is, not by flow compensation). 
182 Larcker and Tayan provide a table of information about CEO 
equity wealth at the 4000 largest U.S. companies, showing: 
 [T]he average value of CEO equity wealth is significantly 
larger than the average value of annual compensation. This 
means that for a typical executive, the incentives provided 
by the equity holdings are at least as important and often 
dominate the incentives provided by annual compensation. 
As a result, a typical executive considers how decisions 
potentially affect total wealth and not just one year’s pay.  
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show that it varies widely across executives, Table 4 shows 
equity holdings by the CEOs at the five Exemplar 
Companies at the time their companies granted them 
additional equity awards at the beginning of 2014. The table 
also compares the total equity holdings of each CEO both to 
the 2014 equity grants and to total 2014 compensation. To 
help explain the differences between CEOs, the table also 
provides the approximate date that each took office. 
 
 
One way to measure the incentive value of wealth is by 
calculating its sensitivity to changes in stock price. For 
example, the median CEO in [the table] stands to gain 
roughly $193,000 in wealth if the stock price increases 1 
percent, $9.9 million if the stock price increases 50 percent, 
and $20.3 million if the stock price doubles. These dollar 
amounts give considerable incentive to perform. 
LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, at 247–48. 
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183 Shares held outright and vested, in-the-money options. The Los 
Angeles Office of Analysis Group calculated all figures in this column 
based on company SEC filings. All calculations are on file with author.  
184 Computed by dividing the number in the column “Total Equity 
Value Owned by CEO When Grants Made” by the number in this column. 
185 Computed by dividing the number in the column “Total Equity 
Value Owned by CEO When Grants Made” by the number in this column. 
186 This column reports the time at which the individual became the 
CEO and does not add any subsequent date on which the individual 
became board chair. 
187 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 62 (sum of Stock 
Awards and Options Awards columns in Summary Compensation Table). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 13. 
190 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 53. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 11. 
193 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 44 (sum of Stock 
Awards and Option Awards columns in Summary Compensation Table). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 10. 
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Note that the value of the options, restricted stock, and 
performance shares being granted in 2014 to each of the 
executives was contingent equity and had—for the CEOs—
almost assuredly less value than the companies reported as 
cost, for all the reasons set out in Section III.B.2. The CEOs 
most likely also discounted the shares that they held 
outright and their vested in-the-money options to some 
extent due to impediments to selling company stock. Most 
public companies impose stock ownership requirements on 
their CEO, mandating that the CEO continuously hold 
common stock in some amount described (i) as shares with 
an aggregate value equaling some multiple of the CEO’s 
salary, or (ii) as a fixed number of shares, or (iii) as an 
 
196 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 54 (sum of Stock 
Awards and Option Awards columns in Summary Compensation Table). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 18. 
199 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 44, 49. Table 4 uses 
this figure instead of the figure in the Summary Compensation Table 
because the equity figures in the Summary Compensation Table included 
some 2013 compensation due to the timing of awards. Id. at 58 n.5 to Sum. 
Comp. Tbl. 
200 Id. at 49 (using number from this page rather than the total 
number in the Summary Compensation Table for the reason stated in the 
previous note). 
201 Id. at 13. 
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amount determined by some other formula.202 Companies 
take this step in order to ensure that executives do not sell 
all their company stock and thereby sever the alignment of 
their interests with the interests of other shareholders.203 
NSC, for example, required Mr. Moorman to own shares with 
a value equal to at least five times his annual cash salary.204 
Intel required its CEO to own a minimum of 250,000 
shares.205 Chevron required its CEO to own shares worth five 
times his cash salary,206 and J&J mandated that its top 
officer own stock worth six times salary.207 JPM imposed the 
most onerous holding rule, requiring that the CEO own a 
minimum of 1,000,000 shares and that, as additional 
restricted shares vest, he keep 75% of them.208 Moreover, 
insider trading law prohibited each of the chief executives 
from selling shares whenever they possessed material 
nonpublic information.209 
 
202 See, e.g., EQUILAR, EXECUTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES 
REPORT 6 (2013) (“The prevalence of Fortune 100 companies with publicly-
disclosed stock ownership policies for executives increased from 86.3% in 
2011 to 89.4% in 2012.”); id. at 8 (noting “[t]he most common guideline 
structure, used by 82.3% of companies with ownership guidelines in 2012, 
defines target ownership levels as a multiple of base salary” and 
describing other formulae, with the second most prevalent being a fixed 
number of shares). 
203 Id. at 4 (“When shareholders invest in a company, they want to 
make sure that the interests of the leadership team are aligned with their 
own. One aspect of this is making sure that the leadership team has a 
financial stake in the company. . . . However, if an executive sells most of 
his or her shares upon the vesting of the awards, that individual’s tangible 
alignment with shareholder interests may decrease. One way to make sure 
that executives have a stake in company performance is by introducing 
some form of share ownership policy . . . .”) 
204 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 48. 
205 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 50. 
206 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 42. 
207 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 34, 50. 
208 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 53. 
209 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–29 (1980) 
(recognizing that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act imposes on 
corporate insiders with material nonpublic information a duty to disclose 
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Even taking all of this into account—that the CEOs 
would discount the contingent equity off the amount 
reported by the company and also discount the market value 
of their shares held outright and their vested in-the-money 
options—the figures in Table 4 provide an important insight. 
Some of these CEOs—but not all—owned so much equity 
(through stock owned outright and vested, in-the-money 
options) that the effect of their decisions on the price of that 
already-owned equity almost certainly would have a greater 
impact on their individual wealth than the effect of those 
decisions on the contingent equity in the 2014 compensation 
packages. 
For example, at the beginning of 2014, Mr. Moorman was 
undoubtedly more concerned about the effect of his decisions 
on the $50,115,175 of NSC equity that he already owned 
than on the $7,504,398 in contingent equity that NSC 
awarded him at that time. Similarly, Mr. Dimon was 
undoubtedly more concerned about the effect of his decisions 
on the $366,276,046 of JPM equity that he already owned 
than on the $11,100,000 of contingent equity JPM awarded 
to him for 2014. Put another way and focusing on the 
incentive power of contingent equity awards, the 2014 award 
to Mr. Moorman did not further encourage him to make 
decisions favorable to NSC shareholders beyond the 
encouragement provided by the $50,115,175 equity stake he 
already held. Similarly, the 2014 contingent equity award to 
Mr. Dimon did not add any incentive to make decisions 
designed to increase the JPM share price that his existing 
$366,276,046 equity stake did not already provide. 
Indeed, when the CEO holds as much equity as Mr. 
Dimon—more than eighteen times his entire 2014 
compensation—it is hard to see how any of the 2014 
 
that information or refrain from trading). Executives can work around this 
limitation by creating, at a time when they do not have material inside 
information, plans that put future sales on automatic pilot by sales 
according to pre-set formulae or discretionary sales by money managers 
over whom the executives exercise no control. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) 
(2017). 
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compensation would much affect his decision making, which 
would be dominated by his enormous equity stake. The same 
may have been true for Mr. Moorman—whose existing equity 
stake was 3.7 times his entire 2014 compensation—though 
this speculation is less compelling than for Mr. Dimon. 
But note that the effect of already-held equity on the 
efficacy of annual contingent equity awards varies from CEO 
to CEO. Thus, while Mr. Moorman’s existing equity stake 
was worth 6.68 times the reported value of his contingent 
equity awards for 2014 and Mr. Dimon’s existing stake was 
worth thirty-three times his contingent equity award for that 
year, the existing equity stakes owned by Mr. Krzanich at 
Intel and Mr. Gorsky at J&J were, respectively, only 1.24 
and 1.02 times each of those executive’s 2014 contingent 
equity awards. Therefore, the 2014 awards to them provided 
incentives that were not swamped by their holdings before 
the awards were made. 
Mr. Krzanich and Mr. Gorsky were in this different 
position because, at the beginning of 2014, both of them were 
relatively new to their CEO positions, having ascended to 
their posts in May 2013 and April 2012, respectively.210 By 
contrast, Mr. Moorman and Mr. Dimon had been in their 
positions since late 2005.211 
All of this suggests that a company that does not 
consider, before making a new equity award to its CEO, the 
amount of equity the CEO already owns—both in absolute 
terms and in comparison to the new equity award 
contemplated—risks paying in a currency that will provide 
no marginal motivation. It suggests as well that a company 
making equity awards annually over several years of a 
CEO’s tenure—and forcing the executive to keep a large 
amount of that equity—risks, as the years go by, awarding 
equity that provides progressively weaker incentives. 
 
210 See Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 11; J&J 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 18; see also supra Table 3. 
211 See NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 13; JPM 2015 
Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 13; see also supra Table 3. 
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4. Total Individual Wealth 
The last subpart makes the point that the differing 
amounts of equity that CEOs hold in their companies affect 
the motivating power of additional contingent equity 
awarded in a given year. But the relationship between pay 
and the CEO’s total wealth—not just that consisting of 
company equity but all of the CEO’s wealth—is also 
important to compensation decisions. 
CEOs are very highly paid, as the total compensation 
figures in Table 4 attest.212 Particularly after occupying the 
top position for many years, a CEO’s individual wealth may 
increase very considerably. Not only will the CEO likely 
accumulate wealth in the form of company equity, but he or 
she also may save or invest the cash received in 
compensation, and may sell some of the equity received and 
save or invest the cash proceeds from those sales. The CEO 
may therefore invest in all kinds of assets—stocks issued by 
other companies, bonds, real estate, and interests in 
partnerships or limited liability companies. This wealth, too, 
may grow over time. CEOs may also inherit assets. In short, 
CEOs may become rich. 
If they are rich, it may be harder to motivate them 
through compensation, regardless of the form that 
compensation takes. As an example, paying $5 million in 
contingent compensation (cash or equity or any combination) 
to an individual with a total net worth of $3 million may 
motivate considerably. But paying $5 million in contingent 
compensation to an individual with $200 million in net worth 
may motivate little or not at all. The theoretical statement of 
this instinctual truth is that the marginal utility of each 
additional dollar from compensation declines with the total 
 
212 See also LARCKER & TAYAN, GOVERNANCE MATTERS, supra note 25, 
at 222 (showing median compensation at 100 of the largest U.S. companies 
in 2013–14 at $13,713,000, and median compensation at the next largest 
400 companies at $10,656,000). 
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number of dollars the individual already has.213 Such 
theoretical analysis suggests that, in considering the amount 
needed to incentivize, it may make more sense to think of 
incentive compensation equaling some percentage of the 
CEO’s total wealth, rather than to think of it as equal to an 
absolute dollar amount.214 That leads quickly to the thought 
that, as the CEO’s wealth grows, so does the amount needed 
to motivate. 
A company that fails to learn its CEO’s total wealth and 
consider whether the pay the company is prepared to offer 
will incentivize in light of that wealth, risks paying a lot, but 
not enough to affect top officer decisions. And a company 
that pays large amounts to its CEO over many years risks 
making the CEO so wealthy that the pay the company can 
afford will motivate no longer. In this sense again, it is 
foolish for a company to construct CEO pay without 
considering the particular circumstances of the man or 
woman at the top. 
IV. HOW TO ENCOURAGE RATIONALITY 
The previous Part demonstrates that a company risks 
grave error when it designs a large, complex CEO 
compensation package, heavy on contingent equity, without 
learning and taking into account key individual traits and 
financial circumstances, which could include: 
• The degree to which the CEO believes that he or 
she can confidently predict a straight line from his 
or her decisions through the multiple metrics and 
equity vehicles in the pay package to personal 
economic rewards; 
 
213 JOACHIM WEIMANN ET AL., MEASURING HAPPINESS: THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELL-BEING 118 (2015) (referring to “the diminishing effect of absolute 
income changes . . . .”). 
214 See id. (suggesting that “it isn’t the absolute change in income” 
that affects life satisfaction “but the percentage change in income”). 
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• The degree to which the CEO usefully 
concentrates on manifold goals, some of which 
provide only a small reward; 
• The CEO’s risk aversion in his or her personal 
financial affairs; 
• The accumulated equity that the CEO owns, both 
in absolute amounts and in comparison with a 
contemplated grant of additional contingent 
equity; 
• Whether the CEO applies a hyper-discount rate to 
future economic rewards; and 
• The CEO’s total wealth. 
Since companies do not take such critical facts into 
account now, this Part turns to legal reforms that would 
encourage them to do so. The reforms fall into two categories: 
substantive reform through state law and disclosure reform 
through federal law. 
Before describing them, however, it is important to 
emphasize that this Article proposes a true sea change in 
compensation. It argues that companies should 
systematically take into account a whole new set of factors to 
which they do not now pay attention in an organized and 
determined way. Since this Article proposes this revolution 
at publicly traded firms that have enormous impact on the 
nation’s economy and since the conventional wisdom is that 
the incentive compensation currently paid to CEOs vitally 
affects the success and direction of these key parts of 
America’s economic engine, considerable restraint is in 
order. 
The transition of academic theory and empirical research 
to widespread application in the real world will likely be 
difficult. Each compensation committee will have to satisfy 
itself that it can obtain reasonably accurate information on 
the relevant psychological characteristics of its CEO, and his 
or her unique financial circumstances. It must determine the 
extent to which it will probe the privacy of its CEO in order 
to obtain this information. It must conclude that, once 
discovered, this information will contribute to the creation of 
better compensation packages and that the company can 
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communicate that improvement to shareholders in a 
meaningful way that still protects CEO privacy. 
Shareholders, too, will have to adjust to the inclusion of 
these new factors in compensation design. 
All of this will take time, and the manner in which it is 
accomplished will evolve. Some companies will move more 
quickly than others. Different companies will experiment 
with different techniques to measure and weight different 
psychological factors. Some companies may decide that the 
existing infrastructure—both inside the company and at 
compensation consultants—is insufficiently robust to 
incorporate any of these factors yet. Moreover, the problems 
created by some individual variables—such as a CEO’s total 
wealth dwarfing his or her compensation to such an extent 
that the compensation incentives have no significant 
economic effect on decision-making—can be recognized, but 
not “solved.” 
Accordingly, the reforms below allow companies a 
substantial range of freedom. The reforms require attention 
to the individual personality and circumstances of a CEO but 
do not demand that a compensation committee proceed 
doggedly through a checklist. Still less do they contemplate 
some rigid grid mandating that a compensation committee 
score a CEO on each of several specified personality and 
financial factors, then look for the box on the grid containing 
the ideal compensation scheme. 
So, an imposed revolution on public companies, yes. But 
one without dogma. And the companies fill in the details 
themselves. 
A. State Reform of the Duty of Care 
The independent directors at each public company set 
CEO pay, with the compensation committee taking the 
lead.215 Each director participating in decisions made by the 
full board, and each director participating in decisions by the 
compensation committee, owes a duty of care to the 
 
215 See supra notes 73 and 74 and accompanying text. 
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corporation.216 The law of the state in which the company is 
incorporated defines that duty.217 In broad brush, “[t]he duty 
of care requires that directors ‘use that amount of care which 
ordinarily careful and prudent men [and women] would use 
in similar circumstances.’”218 As a practical matter and 
assuming that the directors will not personally benefit from 
a decision, the business judgment rule protects directors 
from personal liability for violating the duty of care when 
making a decision unless they commit gross negligence in 
collecting and considering the information that is reasonably 
available and relevant to that decision.219 By employing this 
standard, courts avoid second-guessing business judgments 
and focus on the process by which boards reach a decision, 
rather than the wisdom of the actual choice, with the 
exception that the duty of care prohibits extreme substantive 
decisions that cannot conceivably benefit the corporation and 
effectively constitute waste.220 
Directors can virtually ensure that they satisfy their duty 
of care, as applied through the business judgment rule, if 
they make a decision after advice from an expert. Thus, 
Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(e) provides 
that, 
[a] member of the board of directors, or a member of 
any committee designated by the board of directors, 
shall, in the performance of such member’s duties, be 
fully protected in relying in good faith upon . . . 
 
216 See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING 
CORPORATE LAW §§ 8.01, 8.01[A], 8.03, 8.03[A], 8.03[B] (4th ed. 2013). 
217 Id. § 1.09. 
218 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS § 141.02[A][1] (2016) (quoting In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)). 
219 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984), rev’d on other 
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000). 
220 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–
68 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Binks v. DSL.net, Inc., C.A. No. 2823-VCN, 
2010 WL 1713629, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2010); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006). 
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any . . . person as to matters the member reasonably 
believes are within such other person’s professional 
or expert competence and who has been selected with 
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.221  
If the directors consult an expert, it is highly unlikely that 
their decision-making process is grossly negligent. 
All of these general rules apply to directors as they make 
compensation decisions, as shown by the case against the 
directors of the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”). The 
plaintiff shareholders asserted that the Disney directors 
violated their duty of care in hiring Michael Ovitz as 
president of the company by an employment agreement that, 
as it turned out, granted him a severance valued at $130 
million after a non-fault termination only fourteen months 
into his tenure.222 Invoking the business judgment rule, the 
directors won the case, in part because directly or indirectly 
they relied on advice from a compensation consultant.223 
 
221 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2017). 
222 The Walt Disney case produced three important published 
opinions. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) affirmed in part and 
reversed in part rulings of the trial court on motions to dismiss. In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) granted 
judgment to the defendants after a trial on all claims that the court in 
Brehm did not dismiss. In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 35, affirmed that 
judgment after trial. For the express application of the general principles 
set out in text at supra notes 218–221 to hiring Ovitz by an employment 
agreement with the rich severance package, see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 258–
64, In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 745–50, 760–771, and In re Disney, 906 A.2d 
at 51–62. 
223 In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 702–03 (the chair of the Disney 
compensation committee (Russell) took the lead in negotiating the 
employment agreement with Ovitz); id. at 704–05 (Russell and one other 
member of the Disney compensation committee (Watson) worked with a 
compensation consultant (Crystal) to analyze the agreement with Ovitz, 
with Crystal and Watson preparing spreadsheets to value the agreement); 
id. at 763–65 (Russell did not violate his duty of care because he had 
extensive information—from his negotiations with Ovitz over the 
agreement and his analyses with Watson and Crystal—and so was not 
“grossly negligent (in that he failed to inform himself of all material 
information reasonably available in making [the] decision”); id. at 765 
(Watson did not violate his duty of care because he “conducted extensive 
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Delaware courts could work a simple but highly effective 
reform by holding that the individual characteristics of a 
CEO—including such characteristics as the CEO’s appetite 
or distaste for complexity in pay, his or her risk aversion in 
personal finances, the proportion of the CEO’s wealth tied up 
in company equity, and the total amount of the CEO’s 
wealth—can constitute reasonably available information 
relevant to the construction of a CEO’s pay package. Under 
such a holding, a compensation committee, in order to satisfy 
its duty of care, would have to collect and consider that type 
of information or at least reach a reasoned conclusion that it 
could not reliably or usefully do so. Such a holding—by the 
Delaware courts alone—would effectively require the 
majority of public companies to collect and consider such 
vital information, or deliberately decide against that step, 
because more than 66% of all publicly traded companies in 
the United States are incorporated in Delaware224 and 
therefore must apply Delaware law to their directors.225 
Boards of companies incorporated in other states might well 
 
analyses of Ovitz’s proposed compensation package, sharing those 
analyses with Crystal and Russell” at a meeting and discussions with 
them after that meeting, and because he participated in determining a 
particular change in the options granted to Ovitz that occurred before the 
committee vote on the agreement); id. at 765–80 (the other two members 
of the compensation committee did not violate their duty of care in part 
because, by being briefed by Russell and Watson before voting, they “relied 
on the information, opinions, reports and statements made by Crystal, 
even if Crystal did not relay the information, opinions, reports and 
statements in person to the committee as a whole”); see also In re Disney, 
906 A.2d at 59 (noting that Watson and Russell related the substance of 
Crystal’s analysis and information to the compensation committee, which 
therefore was protected by Del. Code § 141(e)). 
224 About Agency, Division of Corporations, ST. DELAWARE, 
https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZN7R-
U9WX] (last visited May 22, 2017). 
225 See supra note 217; In re MS55, Inc., Civil Action No. 10–cv–
00042–PAB, 2011 WL 1084967, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2011); Randy J. 
Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 
771, 779–82 (2009). 
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follow suit, because courts outside Delaware frequently find 
Delaware corporate law decisions persuasive.226 
The directors at a company would violate this duty only if 
they committed gross negligence in assembling data on their 
CEO. Since Part III suggests that there is no one magic 
formula to follow in tailoring compensation to, for example, 
estimates of a CEO’s uncertainty aversion and risk aversion, 
this duty should not weigh too heavily on directors. Boards 
could effectively protect themselves from duty of care 
liability by employing experts. Compensation consultants 
could almost certainly expand their staffs and capabilities to 
supply such expertise. 
Moreover, the loose “gross negligence” standard would 
permit creative experimentation.227 Thus, as boards adjust to 
the new requirement that compensation take into account 
how individual CEOs value and react to different 
compensation schemes, different boards might safely take 
different approaches. Some boards might deem some 
characteristics more important than others. Some boards 
might well conclude that any attempt to continue to fine-
tune compensation by using multiple metrics and equity 
vehicles is too speculative to pursue in light of the 
complicating factors of individual psychology. Some boards 
might decide that psychological factors beyond those 
discussed in this Article are important to compensation.228 
 
226 See Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of 
Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25–28 (2015). 
227 See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the 
Director’s Duty of Attention, 39 BUS. L. 1477, 1491 (“The heart of the 
business judgment rule has always been a recognition by the courts that 
business decisions should not be evaluated 
retrospectively . . . . Sophisticated modern courts further explicitly 
recognize that the private sector entrepreneurial process cannot operate 
unless managers are given the latitude to be innovative and experimental 
and, therefore, to make mistakes.”). 
228 For example, one unpublished paper argues that deft use of cash 
bonuses can help a company get the most out of a narcissistic CEO. Eric de 
Bodt et al., The Equilibrium Assignment of Narcissistic CEOs to Firms 
21–22 (Aug. 31, 2015) (on file with author). 
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But a board could not simply ignore individualized 
analysis—without at least seriously considering whether this 
is the best path—because doing so would be grossly 
negligent, even if an expert advised a board that unstudied 
ignorance of these variables is the wisest course.229 
Alternatively, Delaware courts could eschew a hard-and-
fast duty-of-care rule and state only that the consideration of 
the CEO’s individual characteristics is a “best practice” in 
compensation decision-making. The Delaware Supreme 
Court took this tack in the Disney litigation. It held that the 
directors had a legally sufficient grip on the severance 
package granted to Ovitz at the time they approved his 
employment agreement, even though they did not have a 
specific calculation of the severance he ultimately received.230 
But in the course of its analysis, the court added that “[i]n a 
‘best case’ scenario, all [compensation] committee members 
would have received, before or at the committee’s first 
meeting [on the contract] . . . a spreadsheet or similar 
document prepared by (or with the assistance of) a 
compensation expert . . . disclos[ing] the amounts that Ovitz 
could receive under the [employment agreement] in each 
circumstance that might reasonably arise”—including “the 
cost to Disney of a non-fault termination for each of the five 
 
229 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (stating that a shareholder 
plaintiff in a derivative case can survive a motion to dismiss where an 
expert has advised the board in its decision-making process by alleging 
particularized facts that, if proved, would show that a subject matter (in 
this case the severance cost calculation) that was material and reasonably 
available was so obvious that the board’s failure to consider it was grossly 
negligent regardless of the expert’s advice). By providing this example, 
this Article does not mean to suggest that compensation committees 
should start with the notion that they will take an elaborate psychological 
inventory of their CEO and use the results to fine-tune already complex 
schemes. The critical characteristics identified by the research 
summarized above are few and relatively simple—percent of total wealth 
consisting of company equity, risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, and 
discount rate applied to future returns. 
230 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 56–58 (Del. 
2006). 
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years of the initial term.”231 As a foreseeable and practical 
result of this passage, compensation consultants and lawyers 
advised clients to prepare “tally sheets” showing termination 
payments.232 Similarly, if the Delaware courts were to 
identify, as a “best practice,” express consideration of such 
factors as the amenability of the CEO to pay complexity, the 
discount that the CEO applies to contingent equity 
compensation, and the effect of the top executive’s total 
wealth on the company’s ability to incentivize by economic 
rewards, just that admonition could cause compensation 
committees to explicitly take such factors into account. 
B. Federal Reform of Compensation Disclosure 
Each public company must file a Form 10-K each year233 
and must file with the SEC and distribute to shareholders a 
federally prescribed proxy statement when soliciting proxies 
from shareholders for meetings, including director 
 
231 Id. at 56. 
232 See Client Letter from Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., Landmark 
Disney Decision Provides Guidance for Compensation Governance (July 
28, 2006), http://www.fwcook.com/content/Documents/Publications/7-28-
06_Landmark_Disney_Decision_Provides.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HJ4-
PG3H]; Client Update from Perkins Coie LLP, Delaware Supreme Court’s 
Disney Decision Affirms the Business Judgment Rule and Endorses 
Compensation Committee Best Practices—“Quantify. Discuss. Document.” 
(June 21, 2006), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/ news-insights/delaware-
supreme-court-s-disney-decision-affirms-the-business.html 
[https://perma.cc/H844-8J3G]. The Disney litigation was not, however, 
alone in focusing board attention on the details of termination payments. 
In 2006, the SEC overhauled the executive compensation disclosure rules. 
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Final Rule, 71 
Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006). The new rules, id. at 53,250, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.402(j) (2017), require identification of any circumstances triggering 
payments on termination and, for each circumstance, require the company 
to describe and quantify the payments. 
233 Companies with securities registered under section 12 must file 
annual reports on the form prescribed by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 
(2017). The SEC prescribes Form 10-K as the default form for annual 
reports. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310(a) (2017). 
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elections.234 SEC rules require public companies to disclose 
executive compensation in both their Form 10-K and proxy 
statements.235 Companies typically provide the executive 
compensation disclosure in their proxy statements and 
incorporate that disclosure into their Forms 10-K by 
reference.236 
The compensation disclosure is extraordinarily far-
reaching and detailed. A summary table lists all categories of 
compensation that the company paid to its five NEOs in the 
preceding year and the dollar amounts in each category paid 
to each executive.237 Where the amount of the compensation 
is fixed—as is true of the salary paid for the year and the 
annual bonus actually awarded for the year—the company 
must disclose the amount paid.238 Where the compensation 
takes the form of equity, such as awards of restricted stock 
or options or performance shares, the company must disclose 
the cost to the company according to accounting rules.239 
 
234 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1) (2012). 
235 Form 10-K Part III, Item 11 (2012) (requiring the information in 
Item 402 of Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017))); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-101 (Schedule 14A) Item 8(a) (2017) (same). 
236 Form 10-K, General Instruction G(3) (2012) (“The information 
required by Part III (Items 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) may be incorporated by 
reference from the registrant’s definitive proxy statement.”). 
237 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2017). 
238 The salary and annual bonus to be paid to an NEO based on the 
results from year one would normally be paid to that officer before the 
company files its proxy statement in year two, or is calculable by that 
time. If not, the company must so explain in a footnote to the summary 
compensation table and must later file a Form 8-K to disclose the dollar 
amount of salary or bonus when it is calculated. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 
Instruction 1 to 402(c)(2)(iii) and (iv) (2017).  
239 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2017) requires companies to provide a 
summary compensation table for the NEOs. The regulation requires 
separate columns for (i) stock awards, including restricted stock and 
performance shares, and (ii) stock options—in each case reporting 
“aggregate grant date fair value computed in accordance with FASC ASC 
Topic 718.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(v), (vi) (2017). The PWC publication 
setting out the rules governing the computation of that value, supra notes 
150–156 and accompanying text, elaborates that ASC Topic.  
FISHER –FINAL  
No. 2:599] TO THINE OWN CEO BE TRUE 673 
But the disclosures go further. They include a table 
showing the estimated future payouts of equity and non-
equity incentive plans.240 All outstanding options, executive 
by executive, held at the end of the preceding year—both 
vested and unvested, with exercise prices and expiration 
dates—appear in a different table, which also reports all 
other unvested equity shares.241 Yet another table sets out, 
NEO by NEO, the number of shares acquired in the 
preceding year by exercising options and vesting of stock 
awards and the realized value of the exercise or vesting.242 
Other tables show the pension benefits for each of the NEOs, 
including the actuarial present value of accumulated 
benefits;243 each one’s deferred compensation, including 
withdrawals during the preceding year and balances at the 
end of the year;244 the amounts of compensation and types of 
compensation to which each NEO would be entitled if the 
company were taken over;245 and the amount and nature of 
company equity securities that each of the executives 
owns.246 The SEC also requires that each company include a 
CD&A that describes how and why it chose to compensate 
the executives as it did.247 
Although extensive, none of the existing rules requires 
that the company describe how, or even whether, the 
company’s compensation committee considered the CEO’s 
personal characteristics or financial condition in creating the 
CEO’s pay package. True, the regulations require disclosures 
that, if plucked out and organized differently, would permit 
shareholders to analyze the relationship between some 
individualized factors—such as the size of contingent equity 
 
240 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(d) (2017). The table includes for each of the 
NEOs the threshold, target, and maximum dollar and share payouts. Id. 
241 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(f) (2017).  
242 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(g) (2017). 
243 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(h) (2017). 
244 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(i) (2017). 
245 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(t) (2017). 
246 17 C.F.R. § 229.403(b) (2017). 
247 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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awards in a yearly pay package in relation to the total equity 
that a CEO owns outright or holds in the form of vested, in-
the-money options. But the rules do not require report of, for 
example, any data that shareholders could use to reliably 
compute the CEO’s total wealth or reaction to compensation 
complexity. 
The SEC could close this gap. Currently, regulations 
require CD&As in proxy statements248 and include (i) a list of 
seven items that a CD&A “shall” address,249 and (ii) a list of 
fifteen items that it “may” address.250 The SEC could add the 
following to the first list, thereby mandating that each 
company disclose: “(viii) how the company integrated the 
individual characteristics and financial circumstances of its 
CEO into the compensation decisions for that officer.”251 
Since this is only a disclosure requirement rather than a 
substantive one, a company could respond to this 
requirement by reporting that it did not integrate such 
considerations into its CEO compensation decisions at all. 
For that reason, the rule might most usefully be written to 
permit such a response, but to require a company selecting 
this path to explain why it did not consider such information. 
Thus the SEC could add to the words suggested above: “and, 
if the company did not collect and consider such individual 
characteristics and circumstances in determining the 
compensation of its CEO, why the company did not do so.” 
The federal government has used such phrasing before to 
effectively push companies to take a step that a law or 
regulation seeks to promote, counting on companies’ aversion 
 
248 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Item 8 (2017), requiring disclosure of all 
information specified by 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017) in a proxy statement 
seeking authority to vote shares at a public company in an election of 
directors, with the CD&A specified in 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2017). 
249 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1) (2017). 
250 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2) (2017). 
251 The regulation calls the company “the registrant.” This Article 
substituted the word “company” for readability. Similarly, the regulation 
refers to a company’s “principal executive officer.” This Article substituted 
“CEO.” 
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to the public embarrassment of explaining why they have not 
done what the law or regulation presumes to be desirable. 
For example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 407 required the 
SEC to issue regulations requiring public companies to 
disclose “whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the 
audit committee . . . is comprised of at least 1 member who is 
a financial expert, as such term is defined by the 
Commission.”252 The SEC adopted this rule253 and required 
public companies to comply beginning in either 2003 or 2004, 
depending on the size of the company and the calendar year 
date on which its fiscal year ended.254 A decade later, 
virtually all large public companies had at least one director 
on their audit committees who was an “audit committee 
financial expert,” and a majority had more than one.255 This 
experience suggests that the SEC requirement this Article 
proposes—although phrased only as a disclose-or-explain 
mandate—has a high probability of moving companies to 
incorporate CEO personal characteristics and circumstances 
into their CEO compensation decisions.256 Almost certainly, 
it would cause companies to at least consider whether they 
 
252 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 
745, 790 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2012)). 
253 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(i) (2017). The qualifications for an “audit 
committee financial expert” appear at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(ii) and (iii) 
(2017). 
254 Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
255 DELOITTE, CURRENT TRENDS IN AUDIT COMMITTEE REPORTING 1 
(2015) (based on then most recent proxy statements of companies in the 
S&P 100); id. at 2 (“Every company covered by our analysis disclosed that 
it had at least one financial expert, and 76 percent [had] more than one 
financial expert.”). 
256 See Eric Alden, Blocking the Ax: Shielding Corporate Counsel from 
Retaliation as an Alternative to White Collar Hypercriminalization, 36 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 95, 151 n.178 (pointing to the audit committee financial 
expert regulation as an example of shaming disclosures that have proven 
effective in inducing changes in corporate behavior and stating “[d]esirous 
of avoiding [an] embarrassing disclosure, public companies generally 
strive to find audit committee financial experts whenever possible”). 
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should tailor pay to the personality and personal finances of 
their top officers. 
The rule proposed should be interpreted to permit 
companies to identify what individual characteristics and 
financial factors the company took into account, without 
providing additional specifics. Thus a company could report 
that it took its CEO’s total wealth into account in creating 
his or her pay package without revealing the amount of that 
wealth, or its composition. Similarly, a company could 
disclose that it took into consideration the risk aversion of its 
CEO in personal financial affairs without revealing any 
measurement of that aversion. The CEO’s privacy could 
remain intact. A majority of companies probably would 
choose this path. 
C. Whether the Reforms Are Fair 
While these proposed reforms are useful, it is important 
to consider whether they are fair. In particular, are the 
reforms fair to CEOs? And are the reforms fair to 
shareholders? 
Bluntly, the reforms propose that each compensation 
committee analyze the psyche of its CEO. The CEO might 
consider this an unfair invasion. But more than likely, he or 
she would not. Corporate America uses psychological testing 
widely today and has for many years. The American 
Management Association found in a 1999 survey that 46% of 
employers used some form of psychological testing.257 In 
2013, 57% of large U.S. companies used pre-hire assessments 
that included tests probing for personality traits as well as 
technical skills.258 Far from restricting psychological 
 
257 American Management Association, 1999 AMA Survey on 
Workplace Testing, MGMT. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 44, 46. 
258 Lauren Weber, Today’s Personality Tests Raise the Bar for Job 
Seekers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015, 11:13 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-personality-test-could-stand-in-the-way-of-
your-next-job-1429065001.html [https://perma.cc/6WLH-UXAK]; see also 
Lauren Weber & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Are Workplace Personality Tests 
Fair?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
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evaluations to new hires for lower-level positions, companies 
administer such tests to top executive aspirants as well.259 A 
survey of 82 predominantly large U.S. companies in 2013 
found that 39 gave personality tests to “high potential” 
employees and 34 to “senior executives.”260 Even aspiring 
CEO candidates can find themselves scrutinized by head-
doctors before hiring.261 Thus, while the particular mind-
probing this Article suggests may be new to CEOs, they will 
not find novel the notion that their companies take a 
psychological inventory that affects their careers. And if 
most companies choose to disclose only the fact that they are 
considering results of personality tests and investigations of 




259 Joann S. Lublin, Employers Put Executive Job Candidates to the 
Test, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2011, 2:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703730804576319231860529442 [https://perma.cc/ 
LN6D-N9F8]. 
260 Allan H. Church & Christopher T. Rotolo, How Are Top Companies 
Assessing Their High-Potential and Senior Executives? A Talent 
Management Benchmark Study, 65 CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY J.: PRAC. & 
RES. 199, 204–05, 207 (2013) (describing 95 companies from which 
responses sought and reporting that responses came back from individuals 
at 84). The survey showed that 59 of the 84 used “assessments” for “high-
potential” employees (defined as employees “below the VP level who [are] 
seen as having the capability to progress into leadership positions two or 
more levels beyond their current role”) or “senior executives” (defined as 
“leaders in the mid- to upper leadership levels in the organization (e.g., 
Vice President and above), regardless of whether they are considered high-
potential or not”). Id. at 206–07. Among those employing assessments, 
66% (or 39) used “personality inventories” for assessing high-potentials 
and 57% (or 34) for assessing senior executives. Id. at 210. 
261 Joanna Pachner, Why Top Companies Are Sending Their CEO 
Candidates to the Psychologist, CANADIAN BUS. (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/leadership/why-top-companies-are-
sending-their-ceo-candidates-to-the-psychologist [https://perma.cc/4D3Q-
HTFX]; see also Lublin, supra note 259 (describing the assessment of a 
candidate for the CFO position at Becton, Dickinson & Co., which included 
a long session with a psychologist and online tests for personality and 
strategic thinking). 
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of those tests or any of the dollar amounts of the financial 
circumstances—the CEOs’ privacy will not suffer. 
Moreover, if the compensation committees do their jobs 
well, CEOs will be pleased with the results. Top executives 
who are frustrated by complex schemes will be relieved when 
they receive simpler pay packages. CEOs who are already 
glutted with company equity will receive far fewer (or no) 
contingent shares that they value little, but more cash that 
they value much. Top executives who are particularly risk 
averse in their personal financial affairs, as determined by 
an analysis of their personal investment decisions in the 
past, will be pleased to receive more of their incentive 
payments in cash and less in contingent equity. 
It is quite possible that express consideration of 
personality and financial circumstances will reduce some 
CEOs’ reported pay. As subpart III.B.2 shows, that objective 
cost, particularly for contingent equity, may be vastly in 
excess of the subjective value conveyed to the CEO. For that 
reason, a company concluding that its CEO is highly risk 
averse in his or her personal financial affairs and finding 
that a high proportion of the CEO’s personal wealth is 
already invested in company equity, may decide that it can 
convey the same subjective value to its CEO by substituting, 
for contingent equity, an amount of cash that is less than the 
company’s cost of that equity. A drop in reported pay may 
bruise a CEO’s ego even if he or she receives a pay package 
with the same or more subjective value as the pay package it 
replaces. That, however, is a fair price for pay rationality. 
Whether the reforms are fair to shareholders is a closer 
call. If the compensation committees do their jobs well, 
shareholders will benefit, as the individuals running the 
companies in which the investors place their money will 
receive more rational remuneration. And arguably, pay 
(measured by cost to the company) will decrease—at least at 
those companies that are now making large, expensive 
contingent equity grants to CEOs with high risk aversion 
and a high percentage of their total assets in company stock. 
On the other hand, if companies respect the privacy of 
their top executives, they will disclose only that they are, for 
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example, taking the CEO’s total wealth into account, without 
disclosing that wealth. Shareholders therefore will not be 
able to evaluate how well the companies are applying 
individual characteristics and circumstances in determining 
CEO pay, only that the companies are now considering that 
data. The shareholders’ proxy advisors will find themselves 
in the same position. In that sense, pay-setting will be more 
opaque. But weighing the increased opacity against the 
improved rationality, the balance seems fair. The theory of 
the modern public corporation is that the board runs the 
company, not the shareholders. Necessarily, where 
operations are vast and varied and shareholders meet but 
once a year, the board will be privy to facts that the 
shareholders do not have. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Elaborate CEO compensation structures pile one type of 
pay on top of another. The attention lavished on these 
schemes, as well as their cost, testifies to their importance. 
Yet the companies pay no heed to the personality or 
circumstances of the individuals whom the schemes are 
supposed to motivate. The companies concentrate instead on 
abstract design. It is as though they are picking extremely 
expensive suits for mannequins. 
Top executive compensation should be tailored to the 
individual CEO. Bespoke suits only, please. 
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APPENDIX A. CEO COMPENSATION AT NSC IN 
2014, REPORTED IN 2015 PROXY STATEMENT 
 
Category Explanation 






Each RSU grant settled five years after the date of the 
grant by transferring to Mr. Moorman shares of NSC 
common stock equal to the number of RSUs in the 
grant.264 
During the five-year vesting period, NSC paid Mr. 
Moorman amounts equal to the dividend payments 
made to other NSC shareholders on a number of shares 
equal to the number of RSUs in the grant (“dividend 
equivalent payments”).265 
Because he received an RSU grant each year and 
because each grant vested after five years, at any given 
time Mr. Moorman had, through his RSU grants, 
common stock coming to him in tranches this year, next 
year, and in each of the three following years.266  
 
262 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 54, 62. 
263 Id. at 65 (column (i) in Table titled “2014 Grants of Plan-Based 
Awards”); id. 66 (explaining that column as “represent[ing] grants of 
restricted stock units”). 
264 Id. at 67. 
265 Id. 
266 At the beginning of 2015, Mr. Moorman possessed RSUs that 
would, if vested, provide him with the following number of NSC shares in 




1/29/15 1/27/16 1/26/17 1/24/18 1/23/19 
Shares 17,500 14,000 12,000 14,000 11,950 
Id. at 69. 
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A grant set a maximum number of NSC common shares 
that Mr. Moorman could receive at the end of a three-
year cycle beginning when the grant is made.267 
The maximum number of shares in a grant divided into 
two equal parts, with the number of shares actually 
transferred at the end of the three years in each of these 
halves dependent on NSC’s performance along a 
different variable— 
First Half. The number of shares transferred depended 
on the three-year average after-tax return on average 
invested capital (“ROIC”),268 with a minimum of a 13% 
ROIC necessary for any shares in this half to transfer 
and the number of shares then increasing until all the 
shares in this half are awarded if ROIC reaches 20%;269 
Second Half. The number of shares transferred 
depended on NSC’s total shareholder return (“TSR,” 
which includes stock price appreciation and dividends) 
over the entire three-year performance cycle, as 
compared with the TSR at the five other publicly traded 
North American Class I Railroads (“NACIRRs”) (with 
0% of this half of the maximum number of shares 
transferred if NSC ranked fifth or sixth among 
NACIRRs in TSR, 25% transferred if NSC ranked 
fourth, and an additional 25% added with each place 
above fourth up to 100% if NSC’s TSR was the best 
among all NACIRRs), provided that if NSC’s TSR 
exceeded the median TSR for S&P 500 companies, 40% 
 
267 Id. at 65–66 & n. to columns (f), (g) & (h); NSC 2015 10-K, supra 
note 2; id. at Ex. 10.6, Norfolk Southern Corporation Long-Term Incentive 
Plan Award Agreement Performance Share Units at ¶ 3 (2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 NSC PSU Award Agreement]. The PSUs convert into 
shares of NSC common stock at the end of the three-year cycle. Id. 
268 2014 NSC PSU Award Agreement, supra note 267, at ¶ 3(b). 
269 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 57 (“Return on 
average invested capital for this purpose is calculated by dividing Norfolk 
Southern’s net operating profit after-tax (defined as net income excluding 
interest expense, and adjusted for the effect of capitalizing Norfolk 
Southern’s operating lease obligations) by the average invested capital 
(defined as the average of the current and prior year-end stockholders’ 
equity and total debt balances, which is then adjusted for the effect of 
capitalizing NSC’s operating lease obligations).”). 
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of this one-half of the shares would transfer to Mr. 
Moorman regardless of NSC’s TSR rank among the 
NACIRRs.270 
The number of shares awarded from each one-half of the 
maximum number of shares depended only on the 
variable relevant to that half and was independent of 
the variables governing awards from the other half.271 
At any given time, Mr. Moorman was in the last year of 
a three-year PSU cycle, the second-to-last year of 











NSC set the criteria for an annual bonus not later than 
90 days into the relevant year.273 
For 2014, Mr. Moorman’s maximum bonus opportunity 
was 250% of salary,274 which was $1,000,000275—so that 
the total possible bonus was $2.5 million, an amount 
that could be adjusted downward at the Compensation 
Committee’s discretion and with the expectation that 
the committee would reduce the maximum bonus 
opportunity to 225% of salary or $2,250,000.276 The 
amount actually awarded was a percentage of the 
maximum opportunity determined by three company-
wide performance metrics:277 (1) NSC’s operating 
income (“OI”) for 2014,278 (2) NSC’s operating ratio 
 
270 Id. at 57; 2014 NSC PSU Award Agreement, supra note 267, at 
¶ 3(a). 
271 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 57 (“Each half of 
performance share units granted vests independently of the other half and 
its respective performance metrics.”). 
272 NSC called the payment an “annual incentive award” or “Non-
Equity Incentive Plan Compensation.” Id. at 54, 62–63. 
273 Id. at app. A § 3. 
274 Id. at 54. 
275 Id. at 62. 
276 Id. at 54. 
277 Id. at 55. 
278 NSC’s operating income for 2014 for the purpose of compensation 
calculations equaled $3.575 billion. Id. at 56. This was the “income from 
railway operations” shown on the company’s audited financial statements 
for the year. NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K40. That figure equaled the 
railway operating revenues minus railway operating expenses (e.g., 
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(“OR”)279 for the year, and (3) NSC’s composite service 
measure (“CSM”) for 2014 (which was “the weighted 
average of adherence to operating plan, connection 
performance, and train performance, with weights of 
30%, 30% and 40% respectively”).280 
To calculate the cash actually paid, NSC first computed 
the percentage “payout” for each of the three different 
performance metrics. 
There was no OI payout if OI for the year fell to $2.25 
billion or below. The percentage of the OI payout 
increased with OIs above that amount. Thus, the OI 
factor paid out 30% if OI reached $2.5 billion, 52% if OI 
reached $3.05 billion, with increased percentage payouts 
for larger OIs up to $3.63 billion, at or above which the 
OI factor paid out 100%.281 
There was no OR payout if OR for the year was 76% or 
more. The percentage of the OR payout increased with 
ORs below 76%. Thus the OR factor paid out 30% if the 
OR fell to 74.5%, 52% if the OR fell to 71.4%, with 
increased percentage payouts for lower ORs down to 
69.3%, at or below which the OR factor paid out 
100%.282 
There was no CSM payout if CSM for the year was less 
than 73%. The percentage of the CSM payout increased 
with CSMs above 73%. Thus, the CSM factor paid out 
30% if the CSM equaled 73%, 52% if the CSM factor 
rose to 77.2%, with increased payouts for higher CSM 
 
compensation, fuel, and depreciation). Id. Operating income did not 
include interest on debt. Id. 
279 Operating ratio is “a measure of the amount of operating revenues 
consumed by operating expenses.” NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K21. 
Those operating expenses include depreciation. Id. at K40 (which shows 
total railway operating expenses, including depreciation, at $8.049 billion 
and railroad operating revenue at $11.624 billion, so that the operating 
ratio was 69.2%—the figure reported in the NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, 
supra note 12, at 7). 
280 NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 55. 
281 Id. at 56. 
282 Id. 
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percentages up to 82.5%, at or above which the CSM 
factor paid out 100%.283 
Once NSC had computed the “payout” for each of the 
three factors, it then weighted those payouts 50% for OI, 
35% for OR, and 15% for CSM284 and applied that final 
percentage to Mr. Moorman’s downward-discretion-
adjusted bonus opportunity.285 
The bonus was subject to a maximum so that “the 
annual incentive paid to any individual executive under 
the plan will not exceed the lesser of three-tenths of one 
percent of NSC’s income from railway operations for the 
incentive year or ten million dollars.”286 
In 2014, the company results and resulting factor 











OI $3.575 91.2% 50% 45.6% 
OR 69.2% 100% 35% 35% 
CSM 69.9% 0% 15% 0% 
Total Summary Percentage: 80.6%287 
At the end of the year, the Compensation Committee 
exercised its discretion to reduce Mr. Moorman’s bonus 
opportunity to 225% of his salary.288 
Thus his actual cash bonus for 2014 was 80.6% of the 
$2,250,000 = $1,813,500.289 
 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 55. 
285 Id. at 54. 
286 Id. at 56. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 54. 
289 Id. at 62 (Summary Compensation Table, column (g)). The 
Compensation Committee had the right to reduce Mr. Moorman’s annual 
cash incentive award on the basis of his individual performance (as 
opposed to the performance of the company, as reflected in the metrics 
used to compute the award) but determined that Mr. Moorman, like other 
executives, had “met or exceeded expectations” and therefore did not 
reduce his cash incentive payment. Id. at 54. 
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The exercise price for each option grant equaled the 
higher of the closing price, or the average of the high 
and low price, of NSC stock on the effective day of the 
grant, which was the first day of the trading window in 
which NSC executives could buy or sell NSC stock after 
the release of NSC’s yearly financial results.290 
All of the options in a grant vested four years after the 
grant date.291 During the four-year vesting period, Mr. 
Moorman received dividend equivalent payments for the 
shares on which he had options.292 Mr. Moorman could 
exercise the options in a grant at any time after the 
options vested and before they expired on the tenth 
anniversary of the grant.293 
At any given time, Mr. Moorman had, through these 
grants, the opportunity to buy stock under options that 
would vest this year, next year, and each of the 
following two years, as well as options that had 
previously vested that he had not exercised but had not 
yet expired. Since the exercise price was—for the option 
award in any given year—set at the price of NSC stock 
 
290 Id. at 56. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 NSC states that it may grant options for a term up to 10 years 
(which includes the vesting period). NSC 2015 10-K, supra note 2, at K67 
n.12 to NSC and Subsidiaries Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. 
NSC states that it granted Mr. Moorman options on 87,880 shares of stock 
on 1/23/2014, NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 65, and that 
options on the same number of shares will expire on 1/22/2024, id. at 68, 
10 years later. 
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Category Explanation 
at the time of that year’s award, the exercise prices 
differed for each grant.294 
 
 
294 Thus, at December 31, 2014, Mr. Moorman had options on shares 
as follows: 
















123,030  50.740 01/23/2018 
137,500  38.705 01/28/2019 
112,500  47.760 01/28/2020 
 83,000 62.745 01/26/2021 
 76,000 75.140 01/25/2022 
 102,000 69.830 01/23/2023 
 87,880 94.170 01/22/2024 
NSC 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 12, at 68. 
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APPENDIX B. CEO COMPENSATION AT THE 
OTHER FOUR EXEMPLAR COMPANIES IN 2014, 





















The Compensation Committee set incentive cash target 
amount, which was then multiplied by a weighted 
average percentage of three factors: 
An absolute performance factor = !"##$%&  !"#$  !"#  !"#$%&!"#$%&'(  !"#$  !"#  !"#$%&   
A relative performance factor = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙  %  𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦  𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  %  𝑛𝑒𝑡  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
An operational performance factor = the corporate 
average of percentage achievement of operational 
performance goals for 10 different groups, each with 
three to four internal goals, for a total of 32 goals for all 
groups, with scoring for an operational goal topped at 
5%, and this entire percentage subject to a 5% kicker 
for corporate level executives including the CEO, with 
25% weight for the first factor, 25% for the second 
factor, and 50% for the third factor.296 
 
295 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 38 (“[I]n 2014 we 
ceased granting stock options to our listed officers, so that all of their 
equity awards are delivered in the form of variable performance-based 
outperformance restricted stock units (OSUs) and restricted stock units 
(RSUs), which align their compensation with the long-term interests of 
Intel’s stockholders by focusing our executive officers on both absolute and 
relative TSR.”). 
296 Id. at 42–44, 57–59. The operational goals are a broad mix—e.g., 
“PC client billing volume,” “Innovate for future leadership: Skylake 
desktop schedule,” “Launch products shown at CES,” and “Deliver 
optimized Android* on Intel® architecture (IA) platforms.” Id. at 58. The 
scheme also includes quarterly cash incentive payments, id. at 59, which 
are relatively small ($133,000 paid to CEO for 2014, id. at 54, out of total 
compensation valued at $11,197,400, id. at 53). The amount of the 
quarterly payments depends on Intel’s profitability. Id. at 59. Included in 
the quarterly cash incentives, Intel also pays “up to an additional two days 
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The Compensation Committee could adjust the 
incentive payment up or down by 10% to 20% “based on 
the individual’s performance to enhance the link 




The Compensation Committee set total value of annual 
equity awards to NEOs, then divided this value among 
the officers, with about 60% in target PSUs298 and 40% 
in RSUs.299 
The actual number of performance shares depended on 
Intel’s TSR relative to the TSR for its technology peer 
group over the three-year performance period following 
the grant date of the PSUs. 
Executive receives: 
• 100% of target shares if Intel is within 1% of the 
peer group median; 
• if above the median, number of shares increases by 
4% for each 1% that Intel’s TSR exceeds the median 
(up to a maximum of 200% of targeted shares); and 
• if below the median, number of shares decreases by 
2% for each 1% that Intel’s TSR falls below the 
median but executives receive no shares if Intel’s 
TSR is more than 25% below the median.300 
Performance stock units are settled in common stock.301 
Executive is always in three different three-year 
performance cycles. 
 
of compensation for each performance year if Intel achieves its customer 
satisfaction goals.” Id. at 45. 
297 Id. at 43. 
298 Intel calls its performance stock units “outperformance restricted 
stock units” Or “OSUs.” Id. at 38. For comparison purposes and because 
the OSUs are economically the same incentive tool as PSUs, the table 
refers to the OSUs as PSUs. 
299 Id. at 45. 
300 Id. at 46. 
301 Id. 
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RSUs for any given award vest in approximately equal 
amounts quarterly over three years.302 
Executive is always in 12 vesting cycles. 
RSUs may be settled in common stock unless the 






Options Management Compensation Committee (“MCC”) set 
intended grant date value for LTIP equity to CEO,306 
which was then divided into 60% awarded in options 
and 40% in performance shares.307 
Options vest over three years, 1/3 each year.308 
Options in a particular grant expire 10 years after the 
grant date.309 
Executive is always in three vesting cycles and up to 
seven exercise cycles—with different exercise prices for 





Annual cash bonus was cash salary times a target 
percentage set by the MCC (e.g., 150% for the CEO in 
2014)310 times a percentage Corporate Performance 
Rating times an individual performance factor.311 
 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at A-7 (Intel Corporation 206 Equity Incentive Plan, As 
Amended and Restated Effective May 21, 2015, § 8(b)(v)). 
304 Percentages computed from summary compensation tables unless 
otherwise stated. 
305 Intel 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 14, at 53 (computed as 
reported value of stock awards divided by reported total value of 
compensation). 
306 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 40. 
307 Id. at 38, 39. 
308 Id. at 38. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 34, 38. 
311 Id. at 34. 
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The Corporate Performance Rating was determined: 
• 40% by financial factors (broken down into earnings 
and earnings per share, return on capital employed 
and TSR over one, three, and five years) 
• 20% by health, environment, and safety (broken 
down into process safety, personal safety, and 
environmental performance) 
• 25% by operating performance (broken down into 
operating expenses, segment earnings per barrel, 
production, reserves, and asset utilization rates) 
• 15% by milestones and commercial (broken down 
into major capital projects and commercial 
transactions)312 
Thus, four factors with an aggregate of 13 different 
measurements.313 
The individual performance factor “is largely a personal 
leadership dimension, recognizing the individual effort 
and initiative expended and demonstrated progress on 
key business initiatives during the course of the year” 










Target number of shares determined by the average 
price of stock in 20-day period before grant date.315 
Actual number of shares settled determined by 
Chevron’s TSR rank over three-year performance 
period, relative to the TSR for performance share peer 
group consisting of Chevron and four other oil 
companies.316 
Executive credited with the following percentages of 




312 Id. at 35. 
313 Indeed, some of the “measures” appear to incorporate multiple 
data points. For example, “Total Shareholder Return” includes measures 
for one, three, and five years. Therefore, it is only one measure, but has 
multiple inputs. Id. at 35. 
314 Id. at 34. 
315 Id. at 40 tbl. n.*, 46 tbl. n.2. 
316 Id. at 38–39. That peer group consists of BP, ExxonMobil, Royal 
Dutch Shell and Total. Id. at 35. 
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Award then settled in cash by multiplying the number 
of shares credited times the 20-day trailing average 
price of Chevron stock at the end of the performance 
period.318 
Executive is always in three performance cycles. 
Restricted 
stock 
Company only issues RSUs “from time to time”319 and 
issued none to the CEO in 2014.320 
Compensation 
in equity 
52% (including performance shares) but 33% if only 
options counted as equity321 given that the performance 
share awards are settled in cash.322 
 
Johnson & Johnson 
Options All options in any year’s grant vest at end of three 
years and are exercisable thereafter until 10 years after 
grant.323 
Executive is always in three vesting cycles and up to 




Annual performance bonus determined by multiplier 
applied to performance bonus opportunity,324 which is 
 
317 Id. at 39. 
318 Id. at 47–49. 
319 Id. at 40. 
320 See the blank for Watson in the column labeled “Market Value of 
Shares or Units of Stock That Have Not Vested” in the table on 47, 
together with note 3 to that table. The column shows that there were RSU 
awards to three other executives in 2014. 
321 Chevron 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 18, at 44 (computed as 
reported value of stock awards plus option awards, divided by reported 
total value of compensation). 
322 Id. at 38, 48 tbl. n.2. 
323 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 42. 
324 Id. at 47. 
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set as a percentage of salary.325 
Single-year performance measures (with a range goal 
for each) were 
• Operational sales growth (“sales increase due to 
volume and price, excluding the effect of currency 
translation”) 
• Free cash flow (“net cash from operating activities 
less additions to property, plant, and equipment”) 
• Adjusted operational earnings per share growth 
(which excludes the effect of currency translation)326 
The proxy suggests that other objectives also play a 
role—e.g., innovation (as shown, for example, by 
successful product introductions and spending 11% of 
revenue on research and development); execution (as 
shown by strategic divestitures and exceeding revenue 
and cost synergies goals at a newly acquired business); 
 
325 Id. at 41. 
326 Id. at 32–33. Adjusted earnings per share also excludes “special 
items as set forth in Exhibit 99.2O to [J&J’s] . . . Form 8-K dated January 
20, 2015.” Id. at 33. That 8-K states: 
The Company provides earnings before provision for taxes 
on income, net earnings, net earnings per share (diluted), 
and effective tax rate on an adjusted basis because 
management believes that these measures provide useful 
information to investors. Among other things, these 
measures may assist investors in evaluating the 
Company’s results of operations period over period. In 
various periods, these measures may exclude such items as 
significant costs associated with acquisitions, 
restructuring, litigation, and changes in applicable laws 
and regulations (including significant accounting or tax 
matters). Special items may be highly variable, difficult to 
predict, and of a size that sometimes has substantial 
impact on the Company’s reported results of operations for 
a period. Management uses these measures internally for 
planning, forecasting and evaluating the performances of 
the Company’s businesses, including allocating resources 
and evaluating results relative to employee performance 
compensation targets. 
J&J, Current Report (Form 8-K) Exh. 99.2O n.A to tables (Jan. 20, 2015). 
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and global reach (as shown, for example, by sales 
growth in both developed and emerging markets).327 
Proxy does not disclose how the company weighted 
these various factors in determining the multiplier. 
No individual bonus to be paid unless consolidated net 
earnings are positive, and no individual bonus to 

















Committee and board set target compensation and pay 
mix,329 which then sets a target number of performance 
shares units330 that vest over a three-year performance 
period.331 
The number of shares awarded depends on three 
metrics: 
1. 1-year operational sales for each year of the three-
year period 
2. Three-year cumulative adjusted operational EPS 
3. Three-year TSR versus the three-year TSR of a 
composite competitor group,332 which consists of 
32 companies333 
Each factor separately determines how one-third of the 
PSUs translate into number of shares earned (with 
each single year of operational sales determining 1/3 of 
the 1/3 allocated to that factor),334 with no shares 
earned if the company does not meet the threshold for 
the factor, 50% earned if the company meets the 
threshold, 100% earned if the company achieves the 
target, and 200% earned if the company achieves the 
 
327 J&J 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 16, at 32–33. 
328 Id. at 41. 
329 Id. at 46. 
330 Id. at 55. 
331 Id. at 42, 51. 
332 Id. at 42. Both “operational sales” and “adjusted operational eps” 
are non-GAAP measures that apparently exclude the effects of currency 
fluctuations. Id. at 33. 
333 Id. at 45 (excluding from the count the duplicate listings for 
GlaxoSmithKline plc and Merck & Co., Inc.). 
334 Id. at 51. 
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maximum goal (with straight-line scaling between the 
threshold and target and the target and maximum).335 
Executive is always in three vesting cycles. 
Restricted 
stock 
All RSUs for any given award vest at the end of a 
three-year vesting period.336 





JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
Options No options were awarded to CEO for 2014 or 2013338 
but were awarded in prior years.339 
No options were awarded to any of the NEOs in 
2014.340 
Options granted to CEO in 2010–12 and to other NEOs 
in 2013 vested over a five-year period, in five equal 
installments.341 





While the company paid incentive cash and RSUs to 
the CEO in 2014, all of that compensation was 
determined in the following manner: 
Compensation & Management Development Committee 
 
335 Id. at 52–53. 
336 Id. at 43. 
337 Id. at 54 (computed as reported value of stock awards plus option 
awards, divided by reported total value of compensation). 
338 JPM 2015 Proxy Statement, supra note 20, at 58. 
339 Id. at 60. 
340 Id. at 60–61. 
341 Id. at 60–61 and tbl. n.1c. 
342 Id. at 80 (summary of amended plan), 112 (¶ 7(c) of JPM Long-
Term Incentive Plan, as amended and restated effective May 19, 2015)). 
The 10-year limitation is not among the changes listed on page 75, 
indicating that the limitation was in the plan when it was last approved 
by the shareholders in 2011. 
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(“CMDC”) set the CEO variable compensation and how 
it would be divided between cash and equity.343 In 
doing so, the CMDC did not use a formula344 but 
considered 
• Performance 
• Value of the position to the organization and 
shareholders over time 
• Setting an example for others by doing “what’s 
right” and strengthening company culture 
• Market data 
• Internal pay equity among the Operating 
Committee members345 
Performance was evaluated in four broad categories: 
1. Business and financial results (e.g., net income, 
increase in tangible book value, return on tangible 
common equity, increase in Basel III Tier 1 capital 
ratio) 
2.  Risk and control outcomes (e.g., increase in 
spending on regulatory and control issues) 
3.  Client and customer goals (e.g., investment banking 
operation “participated in nine of the top ten fee-
paying transactions”), and 
4.  People management and leadership objectives (e.g., 
work with board and CMDC on succession 
planning)346 
over an unspecified multi-year period347 with the 
assessment not formulaic348 but “holistic,”349 
“balanced,”350 “disciplined,”351 and “rigorous.”352 
 
343 Id. at 50. 
344 Id. at 39. 
345 Id. at 38–39. 
346 Id. at 38, 42 (taking examples from report of CEO’s 2014 
performance). 
347 Id. at 38. 
348 Id. at 39. 
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The CMDC had complete discretion to apply business 




No performance shares granted. 
Restricted 
stock 
Amount paid in RSUs determined as set out in the 
annual bonus column. 
RSUs vest over three years, with one half vesting after 
year two and one half after year three.354 
But the vesting is subject to conditions, including a 
minimum 15% cumulative return on tangible common 
equity,355 which “measures the Firm’s earnings as a 
percentage of average [tangible common equity],” which 
is “the Firm’s common stockholders’ equity (i.e., total 
stockholders’ equity less preferred stock) less goodwill 
and identifiable intangible assets (other than 
[mortgage servicing rights]), net of related deferred tax 
liabilities.”356 
Thus, assuming an award every year, an executive is 








353 Id. at 39. 
354 Id. at 50. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 109. 
357 Id. at 44, 49 (computed as stated value of RSUs divided by stated 
value of total compensation). The table uses the figures on pages 44 and 49 
instead of computing the percentage from the summary compensation 
table because the equity figures in the summary compensation table 
included some 2013 compensation due to the timing of awards. Id. at 58 
n.5 to tbl.l. 
